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Abstract 
It is often suggested that various social or value attributes of voters provide them with 
important cues that divide voters in their political preferences and thus determine their 
party choice. This mechanism can be referred to as cleavage voting and this thesis aimed 
to examine which of the investigated five cleavages and respective divides that define 
them are most relevant in explaining party choice. A number of different multinomial 
logistic regression models were tested for this purpose on recent World Values Survey 
data. While empirical analysis left some uncertainties, economic cleavage was found to 
be mostly expressed by attributes such as social class and occupation, while in case of 
religious and residential cleavages, religious denomination and geographical location 
respectively appeared to characterize these cleavages. In contrast to some previous works, 
class and religion were not found to be the most appropriate predictors of party choice. 
Instead, residential and with some limitations economic cleavages emerged as most 
important in this regard, with religious and national cleavages as the second group of most 
relevant explanations for party choice. Whereas the relative insignificance of value 
dispositions was not unexpected, the prominence of residential cleavage allows to assume 
that geographical location encompasses various important motives for party choice. 
Although residential cleavage appeared to be significant everywhere, cleavage voting is 
not a uniform phenomenon in all new democracies as theory might suggest. With 
economic cleavage dominating in South America, cleavage voting there is still to some 
extent lower than elsewhere, while in case of post-socialist countries it is on the contrary 
higher with national cleavage being a more relevant factor in party choice. In highly 
industrialized countries, theories of modernization seem to hold: in such contexts value 
cleavage is substantially more important while religion less relevant in party choice in 
comparison to less industrialized countries. 
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Introduction 
The question of why voters vote the way they do has puzzled political scientists almost 
since the beginning of political studies. Voting behavior is perhaps one of the most studied 
areas of the discipline and it should not be too difficult to understand why. In a democratic 
political system voting may be considered as one of the most relevant processes in the 
context of the systems theory, where the demands of voters can be perceived as the inputs 
and their choices as outputs of the political process. Moreover, this also means that voting 
creates a crucial link between individual voters and the broader political arena. This 
relationship is clearly mediated by voting and behavior of voters. As follows, the process 
of voting as well as behavior of voters to a large extent determine the nature and 
functioning of a political system, which is also true for different phenomena affecting 
voting behavior. In this respect, this thesis examines the effect that divisions in society 
have on party choice of voters and it seeks to reveal which divisions are most relevant 
regarding voting behavior. 
The exact causal relationship is however more questionable and complex than might seem 
at first. To begin with, an uncertainty lies even in the direction of the causality since it is 
not clear whether political outcomes are determined by the choices of voters or is it the 
party system that shapes the preferences of voters (Colomer and Puglisi 2005, 502–3). 
The ambiguity furthermore concerns the assumed independent variable in this 
relationship, i.e. voting behavior that can itself be reliant on different variables. Several 
theories have been established to describe the mechanisms that influence behavior of 
voters. Perhaps the simplest model emphasizes the material interests of voters (Manza, 
Hout, and Brooks 1995, 140) and refers to economic voting (Roper and Fesnic 2003, 
119). Accordingly, voters are determined to support parties that most likely represent their 
own narrow economic interests. Simply put, voters with lower incomes choose parties 
that are keener on redistribution, while those with high income support parties that would 
allow them to maintain their material advantages. This coincides well with economic or 
instrumental theory of political behavior where the choices made by voters are rational, 
entirely self-interested and driven by mere utility (Nieuwbeerta, de Graaf, and Ultee 2000, 
329). On the other end of the spectrum are theories that consider voting behavior as an 
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extremely stable phenomenon and give priority to historical experiences of social groups 
and networks (Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995, 140). In this case the patters of voting 
behavior are determined by the organization of society and rooted in its formation. It is 
thus not only historical legacy but also culture that shape voters’ perceptions (Roper and 
Fesnic 2003, 129). The midpoint of these two extremes is occupied by approaches that 
consider social structure as the point of departure in voting behavior. This line of 
reasoning suggests that the main determinant of partisanship is indeed the position of 
voters in society and their social attributes, but at the ballot boxes voters also follow their 
own interests that are inferred from these attributes.  
This theory is perhaps best captured by the Michigan School and their respective model 
according to which social structural variables are at the beginning of the causal 
relationship and have a strong impact on the social-psychological attributes that 
eventually predict vote choice (Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995, 140). At the core of the 
Michigan model is party identification. Although this can be defined simply as “the sense 
of personal attachment which the individual feels towards the party of his choice”, such 
party affiliation is assumed to originate from family, socialization and norms (Thomassen 
and Rosema 2009, 43). The Michigan Model is however not the only explanation of how 
different phenomena have an effect on voting behavior and this causality has also been 
described by various other very similar models. Raymond (2011), for instance, has 
adapted the original Michigan Model to demonstrate how social cleavages influence vote 
choice in case of religious voting in particular. In addition to the simple link between the 
two variables, he also considered the intervening effects of left-right self-placement, party 
leader preference and economic evaluation. An analogous approach has been taken by 
Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995, 499–500) who in their conflict model of party choice 
distinguish between three types of voting. Structural voting would indicate that voters 
acquire their preferences from structural variables such as social class or religious 
denomination, while value voting describes vote choice as originating from value 
orientations of voters. On these terms, cleavage voting would occur when it is assumed 
that the value orientations which immediately shape the vote choice are themselves 
derived from structural variables shared within different social groups. In an attempt to 
capture the distinct understandings of the mechanism behind voting behavior, Thomassen 
7 
 
(2005, 8) in his conceptual framework has neglected the direct relationship between 
structure and vote choice and instead explained the latter entirely through cumulative 
effect of different variables. According to this framework, it is possible to differentiate 
long-term dispositions from short-term tendencies that influence voting, referring 
respectively to party identification and value and ideological orientations on the one hand, 
and issues, retrospective judgments and political leaders on the other.  
What this multitude of approaches to voting behavior implies is that the motivations and 
exact causation behind vote choice are both relatively complex and unclear. Yet, all the 
interpretations described here seem to suggest that the most basic source of vote choice 
is social structure in one way or another. Voters’ location in social, economic and cultural 
realms determine the ways in which they perceive political competition and evaluate 
political parties, despite that this relationship might be weak and mediated by other, 
perhaps even more influential factors in terms of vote choice. These structural attributes 
that have the potential to shape voting behavior in direct or more ambiguous ways are 
often referred to as cleavages, thus cleavage voting describes the condition of structural 
variables having an effect on the outcome of voting. Of course, this is only a very loose 
and brief definition that summarizes the conception and it will be further elaborated in 
more detail. The idea itself, however, has been comprehensively theoretically examined 
as well as empirically analyzed and there is an extensive amount of literature available 
on cleavage voting. 
Contemporary interest in cleavage voting has its origins in early theoretical works on 
class struggles and conflict which dates back to more than a century, although the basis 
for current research was established in the postwar era (G. Evans 2000, 403–4). Whereas 
most of the early work took the existence of social cleavages and their impact on voting 
behavior for granted, much of the research on cleavage voting from the past decades has 
been more often than not involved with settling the argument of whether cleavage voting 
is in decline or not. Consequently, most of the inquiries into this question have been 
longitudinal and almost exclusively aimed their attention on the party systems in 
established Western democracies and examined only a few cleavages. Although there are 
also a handful of studies that have covered a larger number of countries, for the most part 
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studies on cleavage voting have concentrated on only several countries or a single country 
at a time and these tend to be the same cases throughout the literature considered here1. 
Thus, the research on cleavage voting has thus far been rather limited in its contextual 
scope, but also in terms of cleavages included. 
In this respect this thesis aims to differ from most previous works. Instead of evaluating 
and comparing the significance of one cleavage during different time periods in a few 
countries, an attempt is made here to assess the strength of a number of cleavages in a 
wide range of countries. The main question that this thesis seeks to answer is which 
divisions in society have the highest impact on party choice. Since cleavages are here 
defined as multifaceted phenomena, not only cleavages as such, but also the divisions that 
constitute these cleavages are compared. In addition, some differences between world’s 
regions for which previous research and literature gives reason to assume irregular voting 
patterns are also examined. The thesis is structured as follows. First section gives an 
overview of various arguments and theories according to which there are grounds to 
believe that different divisions between voters result in different party preferences. 
Second section outlines these divisions in more detail and suggests a number of 
assumptions concerning the strength of this relationship between divisions and party 
choice. Because evaluating this association is rather complex, third section is dedicated 
to the methods and particularities of measuring cleavage voting. Fourth and last section 
presents the results of empirical analysis carried out in order to answer the research 
question.  
                                                 
1  This includes a number of multi-country studies (Andersen and Heath 2003; Best 2011; Brooks, 
Nieuwbeerta, and Manza 2006; Dalton 1996; Elff 2007, 2009; Knutsen and Scarbrough 1995; Kriesi 1998; 
Lane and Ersson 1997; Lijphart 1979; Nieuwbeerta, de Graaf, and Ultee 2000; Nieuwbeerta 1996; Oesch 
2008; Oskarson 2005; Raymond 2011; Roper and Fesnic 2003) as well as studies examining single 
countries (Andersen and Yaish 2003; Bornschier 2009; Brooks and Manza 1997; van der Brug 2010; 
Gidengil 1989; Graaf, Heath, and Need 2001; Heath et al. 2011; Jansen, De Graaf, and Need 2011; Johnston 
1985; Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995). Of all these only four studies include in their analysis countries 
outside Northern America and Western Europe (Dalton 1996; Lane and Ersson 1997; Lijphart 1979; Roper 
and Fesnic 2003). 
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 Cleavages in voting behavior 
1.1. Definition of cleavages 
While the idea of a cleavages in voting behavior is more or less straightforward and there 
is a relative consensus concerning the exact social attributes that define a cleavage, 
several contrasting approaches to defining the concept can be found. Some definitions 
highlight the cohesion of the groups that together constitute a cleavage. Different social 
categories function as bases for group identification and thus create loyalty to voter’s own 
social group (van der Brug 2010). By this understanding, cleavage voting requires that 
voters acknowledge their belonging to a certain group and cast their vote accordingly. In 
line with this view is somewhat more extreme perception of cleavages that calls for a 
political competition among different groups of the same cleavage. For instance, 
Bornshier (2009, 2) sees the intuitive meaning of a cleavage as “a deep lasting division” 
that is based on a conflict between groups. In any case, by this understanding structural 
difference alone does not create a politically relevant cleavage. 
This approach has also been taken by several authors that have attempted to specify 
conditions for a social division to be recognized as a cleavage. As first argued by early 
postwar sociologists, Andersen and Heath (2003) suggest that persistent group voting 
requires social differentiation and that this differentiation was generationally 
transmittable, but also necessary is physical and social proximity of groups concerned. 
Recent views are however more relevant to cleavage voting. According to Kriesi (1998, 
167), in addition to structural distinction, cleavage involves consciousness of the groups 
involved as well as an expression of a cleavage in organizational terms. Similarly, 
Bornshier (2009, 2) speaks of a social-structural element, collective identity and 
organizational manifestation of a cleavage. Almost identical to the latter two approaches 
are the conditions specified by Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995, 494) who also refer to a 
persistent social division and its organizational form but instead of a shared identity, 
emphasize common values. Thus, in addition to structural distinction and recognition of 
a cleavage by those who constitute it, some authors argue that a political cleavage also 
requires an organizational expression, whether as a political party or some other kind of 
collective action. 
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Other definitions of cleavage disregard such rigid conditions and represent more relative 
approach to the concept. Perhaps the most elementary description falling into this 
category perceives social cleavages simply as “political differences grounded in the social 
structure of a society” (Brooks, Nieuwbeerta, and Manza 2006, 91). As suggested by the 
authors of this definition earlier (Brooks and Manza 1997, 938), what constitutes a 
cleavage are the “differences in political alignment” among social groups. Only 
prerequisite for a cleavage is then that social structure creates a political difference of 
some kind. Whether or not the members of those groups acknowledge their distinction 
from another group becomes irrelevant. This stance has also been taken by Elff (Elff 
2007) who argues that social cleavages can also exist without group loyalties and that a 
necessary condition for their existence is that the differences between groups simply 
become politically relevant.  
I also suggest that in order for social cleavages to be relevant in voting behavior they do 
not require an antecedent identification or organization. Any difference in social structure 
that has the potential to impact vote choice can be identified as a cleavage as long as it 
allows to contrast social groups in terms of their voting behavior. However, this notion 
does not necessarily need to be limited to social differences. I argue that any characteristic 
differentiating voters in voting behavior to the extent that it leads to significantly different 
political outcomes can be regarded as a cleavage. This concerns particularly variation in 
different perceptions of voters, for instance an often noted value cleavage2. Cleavage is 
therefore here defined as any theoretically valid distinction between voters that 
differentiates them in their party choice and that has a theoretical basis for this effect. 
1.2. Theory of frozen party systems 
The origins of cleavage voting can be dated back to the 19th century when the widespread 
interest in class theory prompted various scholars to examine the link between class and 
voting (G. Evans 2000, 403; Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995, 139). It was not until the 
seminal study by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) however that the foundations for studies of 
                                                 
2 See for example Evans (2004, 59),  Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995, 495) or Kriesi (1998, 166). 
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cleavage voting were laid. In their largely theoretical but nevertheless very influential 
work the authors argued that “the party systems of the 1960’s reflect, with few but 
significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920’s” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 
50) and thus claimed that party systems tend to freeze according to cleavages in social 
structure at a certain point in time. In case of Western Europe this came about in the 
1920’s, but it’s important to note that it was not necessarily so for other parts of the world. 
Still, whenever the freezing of party systems took place, it resulted in relatively stable 
patterns of voting behavior within different groups of society. This process may be seen 
as a freezing of traditional social divisions in political terms (Kriesi 1998, 165) and as 
such the cleavage structures provided a basis for an expression of a group-based political 
conflict (Brooks, Nieuwbeerta, and Manza 2006, 89). Whether or not the consequent 
party systems were rooted in a social conflict is a matter of conceptualizing cleavages, 
but the hypothesis of frozen party systems nonetheless established a link between social 
structure and party systems through ballot box. 
The translation of social differences (or conflicts according to Lipset and Rokkan) into 
political cleavages was the result of two historical revolutions that in Western Europe 
occurred around the previous turn of the century, namely national and industrial (Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967, 13–23). The national revolution gave grounds for a conflict between 
the nation-building central culture and opposing periphery, while the outcome of 
industrial revolution was a confrontation based on economy and class. Because cleavages 
were the consequence of interactions between these two “fundamental processes of 
change”, the exact progression of and interplay between these revolutions can explain 
much of the variance among emerging party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 34–35). 
Yet, everywhere can they lead to four distinct cleavages founded on linguistic, religious, 
industrial or economic conflicts between center and periphery, state and church, land and 
industry, owner and worker (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 47). Dalton (1996, 321) 
distinguishes between two reasons why these cleavages were relevant and powerful at 
their appearance. First, cleavages created an institutional foundation for party 
competition, providing not only parties with a base of support, but also voters belonging 
to cleavages with political representation and electoral cues. Second, they represented the 
deep ideological divides of class conflict and religious conflicts between Protestants and 
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Catholics or between secular and religious. However, as such cleavages are inherently 
dichotomous. While this might be true for political parties that usually tend to have a 
single appeal, individual voters and their positions in social groups are not as 
distinguishable and allow for much less arrangement by dichotomies (Elff 2007). This 
perception of cleavages can thus be considered excessively simplified, especially in the 
context of more modern social structure.  
Along these lines, the freezing hypothesis might appear overall too straightforward to 
precisely describe the emergence and functioning of party systems. At first sight Lipset 
and Rokkan seem to suggest that party politics is entirely dependent on social structure 
and that cleavages alone and directly determine what kind of parties surface and how they 
interact with each other. Examining volatility, Lane and Ersson (1997, 181) suggest that 
the model of frozen party systems is rather weak since cleavages are given too much 
credibility. Even in a situation where all voters alter their party preferences or every party 
changes its political orientation, the party system in general would still remain frozen as 
long as it is based on the same cleavages. While it is true that Lipset and Rokkan tended 
to explain variation among party systems almost exclusively in terms of cleavages, their 
perception of how social structure was translated into political contestation was more 
complicated than that. In fact, the freezing hypothesis also takes into account mechanical 
as well as other institutional effects. For instance, electoral thresholds influence how 
difficult it is for emerging parties representing certain cleavages to come forth, but 
perhaps even more importantly, transforming cleavages into party systems depended 
highly on “the costs and the payoffs of mergers, alliances and coalitions” (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967, 32), i.e. party competition. Thus, the way social structure affects party 
systems is not straightforward but conditioned by institutional and possibly even cultural 
context. 
The freezing hypothesis is not merely an explanation of how cleavages shape voting and 
how the causality between social cleavages and politics is structured, but it also provides 
several implications for party politics and voting behavior. For parties, the freezing 
hypothesis suggests that after party systems have undergone initial configurations and 
effectively mobilized their electorate, there is very little room for new movements (Lipset 
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and Rokkan 1967, 51). The first elections in newly established democracies define party 
systems according to social structure and these two will continue to be mutually 
reinforcing. This is a pessimistic view of parties that are not able to adjust themselves 
according to changes in cleavages (Elff 2007), but voters are also expected to conform to 
the behavior of their group and thus maintain their alignments regarding party 
preferences.  Moreover, the idea of group voting as a consensus on political attitudes 
among group members allows making various inferences about political system. For 
instance, cleavages express the most relevant lines of conflict in societies, but it also 
explains the mechanism though which such oppositions are translated into political 
representation. As such, the freezing hypothesis makes a strong case for the importance 
of cleavages and their impact on voting behavior. 
1.3. Origin of cleavages. Social structure or party system? 
According to the freezing hypothesis, similar political attitudes and party support should 
develop in societies that are similar in terms of social structure. Empirical evidence has 
not found this to be true, however (Andersen and Heath 2003, 303). The cross-national 
variation in the relationship between even the most universal cleavages and voting 
behavior suggests that other factors besides social structure are in play.  This is expected, 
since there are contextual features independent of cleavage positions that also provide 
voters with important cues (Best 2011, 279–80). These can be various actions taken by 
parties, such as party agendas and promotion. What this signifies is that the political 
manifestations of social divisions result not simply from social structure, but rather from 
the “interplay between social and political forces” (Jansen, De Graaf, and Need 2011, 
510). This is very similar to the aforementioned view of how cleavages surfaced as 
described by Lipset and Rokkan.  
The understanding that there are two aspects to the development of the nature as well as 
functioning of social cleavages in voting is not uncommon. Andersen and Yaish (2003, 
399–400) discriminate between sociological and institutionalist approach to political 
outcomes, in which case the role of social structure is opposed to the importance of 
electoral systems. From voters’ point of view, this approach is almost compatible with 
contrasting expressive theories and instrumental understanding of political behavior 
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(Nieuwbeerta, de Graaf, and Ultee 2000, 329). Whereas in the first case voters act 
according to their group identity and norms, instrumental theory assumes that voters are 
primarily rational actors in the context of political institutions. Alternatively, when parties 
are taken as a point of departure in defining political outcomes, they can act as dependent 
variables determined by social cleavages or on the contrary, as independent actors that 
decide over relevant cleavages (Colomer and Puglisi 2005, 502–3). These contrasting 
approaches highlight the critical importance of causality in the concept of cleavages. 
There is always a demand and a supply side to the relationship between social structure 
and party system. Voters in need of cues demand the identification of social categories 
which are supplied by political parties that provide voters with representation (van der 
Brug 2010, 588). More in line with social cleavage theory is the distinction between 
strong and weak interpretations of cleavages developed by Zielinski’s (2002, 187–8). 
According to this, cleavages may be purely the result of historical conflicts, but the 
eventual cleavage system might also be determined by how political forces shape these 
conflicts. 
However, the simplest way to perceive this dual origin of cleavages is to comprehend it 
as contrast between top-down and bottom-up relationships. This approach has usually 
been taken to describe various factors behind the often supposed decline of cleavages in 
voting3, since it allows to examine whether the strength of cleavages tends to vary with 
changes in party systems or social structure. According to the bottom-up understanding, 
the attitudes and attributes of electorate at the bottom have an upwards effect that 
determines which parties and thus cleavages are significant. Top-down approach assumes 
that parties and elites at the top have a downwards influence on electorate and salience of 
cleavages depends on this supply side (Bellucci and Heath 2012, 108). As such, this 
directional interpretation accurately describes the independent variables affecting 
cleavages.  
  
                                                 
3 See Bellucci and Heath (2012, 108–9), Bornshchier (2009, 5–6), Evans (2000, 410–2) and Jansen et al 
(2011, 510–1). 
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1.3.1. Top-down approach 
One of the most basic conditions for the emergence of a social cleavage is that voters with 
particular characteristics persistently support certain parties. A cleavage in voting 
behavior cannot therefore develop unless there are parties that represent the respective 
divisions of a cleavage. Unless the concerns of a social group are not represented by a 
party, voters belonging to those groups are constrained to voting on the basis of other 
issues (Andersen and Heath 2003, 304), leaving the cleavage representing their initial 
concern undeveloped. Furthermore, unless there is a political party to represent a certain 
cleavage, the group solidarity may in the long run disappear (Graaf, Heath, and Need 
2001, 3) and so eliminate the possibility of a cleavage emerging in the future. Thus, for 
cleavages to be vital, they need to be embodied in party systems, not the other way around. 
However, parties are not only crucial for representing cleavages, but through that 
representation they also shape the mechanisms according to which social divisions 
become political. This is probably what Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 26) had in mind when 
they claimed that “there are considerations of organizational and electoral strategy” in the 
translation of cleavages into party oppositions. This does not only occur through the 
formation of alliances and oppositions between parties as Lipset and Rokkan often seem 
to have suggested. Parties also have the capability to decide which issues are given 
credibility, how are they politicized and how are different groups addressed in doing this. 
After all, when seeking to establish a base of support, parties one-sidedly identify the 
major social divisions (Johnston 1985, 252) which introduces a critical bias to the 
sometimes assumed direct translation of social conflict to political oppositions. By 
crystallizing conflicts and forcing citizens to ally and align accordingly (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967, 5), it can be argued that parties define relevant cleavages in a society4. 
                                                 
4 For instance, Elff (2009) in his cross-national study on the decline of cleavage voting suggests that the 
phenomenon is better explained by the alternation of parties’ political positions, rather than attributable to 
changes in social divisions. This finding has been backed by de Graaf et al (2001) in their study of the 
Netherlands, in which they empirically demonstrated that the primary cause of decline in religiously 
motivated voting was the unification of three religious parties. 
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1.3.2. Bottom-up approach 
Just as parties are required for cleavages to become politicized, voters are also necessary 
for this to happen. However, unlike parties, that’s emergence and existence are contingent 
on many factors (including cleavages and electoral support), social structure is relatively 
independent or at least resistant to immediate changes that often characterize party 
systems. The causal relationship between voters and parties is from almost every aspect 
unilateral: voter’s social status does not usually result from her partisanship (G. Evans 
2000, 402), while the success and actions of parties are highly dependent on the choices 
made by voters and so on their social background. Even when it is assumed that parties 
define relevant cleavages, they’re highly dependent on social structure in doing that.  
Changes in cleavage structure are therefore unlikely to entirely depend on actions taken 
by parties. Rather, parties can be merely intervening variables in the relationship in which 
social structure determines politically relevant cleavages through voters’ behavior. 
Political relevance of cleavages is however not a prerequisite for cleavage voting or 
cleavages as such but instead a result of it. Cleavages are initially constructed prior to 
elections, so it can be argued that they are formed before becoming reflected in party 
systems. Consequently, if changes in social structure occur, parties are forced to respond 
to these and conform to any shifting of social bases in order to maintain their political 
support (Dalton 1996, 331). Cleavages are thus reflections of social structure and the 
capability of politics to interfere in the process of cleavage formation is limited at best.  
What follows from these arguments in favor of top-down as well as bottom-up approaches 
then is that there is no distinct source from which cleavages originate. Even though the 
decisions of voters at the ballot box are dependent on their background, their choices are 
in most cases almost entirely determined and thus limited by parties as illustrated on graph 
1. Yet, when causality is taken into account, a sociological explanation becomes 
substantially more credible. The way in which social divides are translated into cleavages 
is fairly straightforward, while the influence of politics on cleavages is almost 
inconceivable due to the multiplicity of unreliable causal links. An attempt to explore the 
political explanation would then be a difficult and very likely an indecisive undertaking. 
Therefore, in this thesis the bottom-up approach is taken as a point of departure and it is 
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accordingly assumed that cleavages in voting are organized by the social structure. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that this is not the only theoretical interpretation 
of cleavages and other possibly relevant variables in this relationship exist.  
Graph 1. Schematic comparison of top-down and bottom-up approaches. 
 
1.4. Decline of social cleavages 
The freezing hypothesis as formulated by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) has frequently been 
referred to as the basis for an idea of social cleavages, but this has more than often been 
done with great skepticism. While the idea that social cleavages determine voting 
behavior might have been convincing at the time it was suggested, it might have lost its 
relevance due to various social and economic developments. Despite that some prominent 
research has found that different social cleavages still shape party choice5, a number of 
                                                 
5 Most influential studies that have demonstrated the persistance of traditional social cleavages in voting 
behavior have been conducted by Manza, Hout and Brooks (1995) and Brooks, Nieuwbeerta and Manza 
(2006) based on cross-country data. In the context of United States similar concusions have been drawn by 
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studies have conversely demonstrated trends of a decline. The latter is especially true for 
early studies on class voting that commonly used simple measurements and illustrated 
how working class voters decreasingly voted for left parties (Lane and Ersson 1997, 189; 
Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995, 147). However unreliable these methods might seem, 
Nieuwbeerta (1996) in his cross-national study on class cleavage showed that more 
sophisticated approaches to class voting in fact do not lead to significantly different 
results. His analysis revealed that in case some countries a decline can be observed, while 
in others class voting has remained at the same levels. Kriesi (1998), on the contrary, 
established that although social divides in voting behavior are still apparent, traditional 
perceptions of class voting have become inapt for describing the phenomenon in post-
industrial societies. However, this often noted decline might also be attributed to the 
weakening of certain parties that have traditionally been related to certain cleavages, as 
suggested by Best (2011, 297–8). Thus, even among scholars who accept that the 
traditional explanations of voting behavior have become unreliable, there is no undisputed 
agreement on the exact mechanisms behind this decline. 
A decline is not the only assumption that has been inferred from these tendencies. 
Examining developments in cleavage voting throughout several decades, some scholars 
have concluded that cleavage voting displays a “trendless fluctuation” rather than a 
general decline  (Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995, 822; Knutsen and Scarbrough 1995, 
506; Nieuwbeerta 1996, 370). The findings of apparent decline may simply indicate 
temporary trends that are only part of the larger picture. However, this does not mean that 
the claims about the possible decline of social cleavages are not credible. On the contrary, 
the idea that social divisions no longer structure the patterns of voting in post-industrial 
societies has often been referred to as the “new conventional wisdom” (Dalton 1996, 329; 
G. Evans 2000, 402; Thomassen 2005, 5). The frozen party systems cannot simply have 
survived the changes that have taken place in the social structure during the past century.  
Although the conclusions provided by empirical evidence have been rather unclear, 
                                                 
Hout, Brooks and Manza (1995) and Brooks and Manza (1997). A strong case for the stability of social 
cleavages has also been made by Elff (Elff 2007, 2009). These have all employed longitudinal survey data. 
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theoretical investigations have made a convincing case on the decline and exposed 
various reasons to have confidence in the assumptions according to which social 
cleavages are indeed becoming less relevant. First set of causes are largely concerned 
with the aforementioned changes in social structure and this trend is particularly evident 
in case of more traditional divisions in party choice such as class and religion. Social class 
that was once a highly rigid institution and in terms of voting behavior a very stable 
attribute has become much less restricted. Social mobility has led to higher variation in 
vote choice within classes as a result of voters more regularly relocating themselves in 
social structure. This is also true for geographic mobility, which further undermines 
various social cleavages. Although Nieuwbeerta, de Graaf and Ultee (2000) have 
demonstrated that intergenerational class mobility does not explain variation in levels of 
class voting among countries, despite that mobile voters tend to express different patterns 
of voting, it has often been found that socially more mobile voters also hold more 
intermediate political attitudes in relation to their initial and final class (Manza, Hout, and 
Brooks 1995, 143–4). Secularization in a similar manner has rendered the religious 
cleavage irrelevant, since the number of voters claiming a religious affiliation and 
following religious practice has decreased everywhere (J. A. J. Evans 2004, 56–7). This 
suggests that both social class as well as religion are not as good predictors of vote choice 
as they were before these changes in the social structure, since the number of voters 
aligning strictly along social cleavage lines has decreased. Or, as put by Best (2011), 
“there are simply too few of them to have the effect on electoral politics that they once 
had.” 
The second kind of causes behind the decrease of social cleavages involve developments 
that can be referred to as psychological changes, which are further related to two rather 
distinct approaches. One of these is concerned with the increased material affluence and 
follows a theory of value change. Increased material well-being distances particularly 
lower class voters from the political left and left parties from their characteristic appeal, 
thus weakening class voting but also cleavage politics in general (Best 2011, 283). While 
economic differences between classes led to common class identity, the growing 
differences within these classes imply a collapse of previous class structure and decrease 
of shared interests (Jansen, De Graaf, and Need 2011, 512). As follows, class status or 
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more broadly economic conditions fail to provide voters with electoral cues. This is not 
only the case with class voting, but the heterogenization of religious beliefs may follow 
a similar trend and have an equivalent effect on religious voting. Another line of reasoning 
emphasizes the changes brought about by the expansion of education and explains 
decrease of class voting with theory of cognitive mobilization. Better-educated voters are 
simply more capable of deciding on political matters according to certain issues and based 
their decisions on rational assessment, and therefore such voters are more independent of 
different social attributes in their party choice (Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995, 144). This 
is perhaps what Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 55) had in mind when they noted “the mounting 
revolutions of rising expectations” that challenge governing parties. However, rather than 
simply weakening class or religious voting, proponents of the cognitive mobilization 
theory suggest that traditional social divisions will be substituted by new cleavages, or 
perhaps even a cleavage based on education (Bornschier 2009, 7). These new cleavages 
will supersede voting based on simple social structure, while retaining the logic of 
cleavage voting. 
Although various terms have been used to describe this trend in voting behavior, these 
could be summarized with the notion of new politics. For most obvious and thoroughly 
explored cleavages, such as class and religion, this implies a significant transformation 
of traditional bases of voting. Most notably in case of class cleavage, the conventional 
division between manual and non-manual workers is being overtaken by new class 
cleavages. Particularly crucial here is the emergence of a new middle class (Kriesi 1998) 
or the class of social-cultural specialists (Graaf, Heath, and Need 2001) that has 
substantially blurred the class lines among the supporters of the left. It is not the class 
division in strictly economic sense that now differentiates voters at the ballot box, but as 
Oesch (2008, 349) has demonstrated, class cleavage is still very much relevant in voting 
when cultural differences are also taken into account. Nevertheless, what this signifies is 
that new political matters have become to define party choice which is evident when 
considering the multitude of political issues characterizing contemporary politics. 
Although less so with the moral issues expressing religious cleavage, the material 
questions have to some extent witnessed a decline in political competition while their 
place has been taken by issues such as environmental protection, quality of life or the 
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rights of women (Dalton 1996, 332). As demonstrated by van de Brug (2010), older 
generations are more likely to vote according to their position in social structure, whereas 
younger generations have a tendency to vote ideologically. Consequently, a generational 
replacement incessantly contributes to the decline of traditional cleavages. In addition to 
new political issues, new social divisions that can be based on gender, race or ethnicity, 
have also appeared and replaced the class-based conflict (G. Evans 2000, 405). As 
follows, instead of referring to a decline of cleavage voting, it is perhaps more precise to 
argue that there has been a transformation of traditional bases of cleavage voting. Thus, 
it can be expected that new social or cultural divisions define political competition. 
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 An outline of cleavages 
2.1. Cleavages and social divisions 
Social structure does not unequivocally reflect all the cleavage arrangements it contains 
and there are various social divisions that have the capacity to shape voting behavior. Not 
all divisions in society become cleavages that are relevant in party choice. A brief glance 
at the literature is enough to demonstrate that research on cleavages in voting preferences 
has been mainly concerned with just two cleavages. Social class and religion are most 
important cleavages in Western Europe and have without doubt received most attention 
which has also been noted by several authors (Best 2011, 282; Graaf, Heath, and Need 
2001, 1). Interestingly, these two cleavages coincide well with the framework of Lipset 
and Rokkan (1967, 10) who differentiated between territorial and functional dimension 
of cleavage structures. In case of the two dominant cleavages, religion represents the 
territorial dimension, while class corresponds to the functional opposition. Religion is 
mostly concerned with locality, whether as a conflict between secular center and religious 
periphery or between different religious denominations. Social class, in contrast, 
surpasses both territory and culture and is more involved with interest, hence the 
functional aspect.  
This supports the argument that while territorial cleavages may be more relevant during 
the national revolution and the process of nation-building, they are overcome by 
functional conflicts of industrial revolution (Gidengil 1989, 566). Accordingly, social 
class is a more significant cleavage in developed industrial societies. Its universality in 
comparison to religion is also suggested by the fact that socialist or social democratic 
parties are simply more common than parties representing religious sentiment (Oskarson 
2005, 87). Conversely, it has also been claimed (G. Evans 2000, 401) but empirically 
demonstrated as well (Elff 2007; Hien 2013; Lijphart 1979) that religion, rather than 
social class, might be more consistent and reliable predictor of vote choice.  
In any case, these two cleavages seem to be more relevant in terms of voting behavior 
than any other social division. This is true for at least most of established Western 
democracies where national and linguistic conflicts have commonly been overcome and 
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main conflict lines in party politics are often defined by class and religious oppositions. 
Yet, the importance of these two cleavages is not simply a consequence of revolutions or 
other historical developments that hold merely an abstract association with contemporary 
politics. Andersen and Heath (2003, 302) have argued in the context of political cleavages 
that social and political attitudes in general follow two dimensions: left-right and liberal-
conservative dichotomies. While the former is concerned with economy and state 
intervention in it, the latter is about personal freedoms. I suggest that the reason why class 
and religious cleavage tend to be so significant in vote choice is that they represent these 
two main divisions of political conflict. Whereas social class, or more broadly any 
division in economic sense, is unambiguously a matter of political left-right, religion can 
be considered to represent the liberal-conservative contradictions, where religious is as a 
rule associated with higher morality and a lower level of personal freedom. It can thus be 
assumed that economic and religious cleavages most accurately explain vote choice. 
Just as every issue in a political competition does normally not have equal importance, it 
would be a mistake to assume that all cleavages in any society can be equally relevant in 
influencing vote choice. As Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 6) have argued, only a few 
cleavages can polarize a political system and a “hierarchy of cleavage bases” determines 
the conflict lines in it. One can even go as far as to adopt a “one nation: one cleavage” 
view (Johnston 1985, 245). Consequently, by this understanding there can be only a single 
significant cleavage in every country that defines political conflict. 
Social class and religion are far from being the only division in social structure that can 
have a significant effect on voting behavior. Although those two have received 
undoubtedly most attention, at least in Western democracies social attributes such as 
gender, age and education have also been found to influence vote choice (Andersen and 
Heath 2003, 301). There are certainly other social differences as well that have the 
potential to affect voting. In line with the approach to understanding cleavages taken here, 
practically any attribute that distinguishes voters and subsequently has an effect on their 
voting preferences can be considered a cleavage as long that effect is also theoretically 
valid. This last notion is of critical importance. While the aforementioned gender, age and 
education might be empirically found to predict vote choice, it is somewhat difficult to 
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give a reasonable explanation of how these entirely structural attributes alone could 
change the way voters perceive parties.  
In case of gender, women in some countries tend to support left parties, but this is most 
likely due to the fact that they are more often employed in public sector and more 
dependent on welfare benefits (Brooks, Nieuwbeerta, and Manza 2006, 93). Although a 
substantial generational effect on motivations behind vote choice has been found  (van 
der Brug 2010, 602–3), age does not affect vote choice in terms of preferring left to right 
or vice versa  (Andersen and Heath 2003, 316). This suggest that just like education that 
has an impact, although negligible, on voting through an influence on the attitudes and 
values of voters (Jansen, De Graaf, and Need 2011, 523), age also shapes voters’ ways of 
thinking, although younger and older cohorts could also be more prone to vote for left 
due to economic reasons. Education, and to some extent age, should thus not be treated 
as cleavages as such, but it would be theoretically more correct to observe values and 
attitudes that have a more immediate impact on voting behavior. While it can be argued 
that all cleavages affect vote choice merely by shaping voters’ attitudes, the recently 
described three attributes have very little direct effect and their influence is more likely 
motivated by economic incentives. They lack the more functional association with vote 
choice that can be observed, for instance, in case of social class or religion. Moreover, 
parties that more or less exclusively represent only certain groups of gender, age or 
education are rare. 
In forthcoming sections, gender, age, nor education are thus considered as cleavages. 
Instead, five distinctions in case of which there are theoretical motivations to believe that 
they have a significant potential to directly affect party preferences are examined. These 
will be introduced in the next section. 
2.1. Composition of cleavages 
A total of five distinctions that can be observed in social structure and hold a more 
immediate relationship to vote preferences are regarded as cleavages here. These are 
economic, religious, residential, national, and value cleavage. While the economic 
cleavage has generally been referred to as social class cleavage, the latter term has more 
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than often been used to describe cleavage based on work logic, i.e. the employer-worker 
cleavage. A number of studies (Jansen, De Graaf, and Need 2011; Manza, Hout, and 
Brooks 1995; Nieuwbeerta, de Graaf, and Ultee 2000) has also demonstrated that class 
cleavage is considerably more complicated than a simple distinction between higher and 
lower social classes. In addition to the four social cleavages, a fifth cleavage is included 
that captures only the psychological propensities in voting behavior, namely the value 
cleavage. However, cleavages are not as simple phenomena as that, since there are various 
ways to define and operationalize each of them. What exactly is it that expresses a 
cleavage in social structure? For instance, in a given society there may be no variation 
regarding voting behavior between voters who consider themselves to be religious and 
those who do not, while religious denomination in the same context can be a significant 
predictor of vote choice6. Such tendencies are perhaps even more relevant in case of 
economic cleavage. One of the main reasons behind contrasting findings regarding the 
strength of class cleavage is very likely differences in how class is conceptualized, since 
categorizations of class can be based on various attributes (Oesch 2008, 330). 
Consequently, there is a risk of making incorrect assumptions about the relevance on 
different cleavages. This not simply a matter of measurement, but rather 
conceptualization. For this reason I distinguish cleavage components to more precisely 
describe the phenomena different cleavages represent so that each cleavage would 
encompass all relevant attributes. A description of these follows.  
2.1.1. Economic cleavage 
Class has supposedly been the most common and straightforward phenomenon to 
describe social cleavages in voting behavior. Here this is referred to as an economic 
cleavage and is comprised of four components that characterize the economic situation 
of voters in one way or another. 
Subjective social class. Class is probably the most basic approach to describing different 
                                                 
6 Something similar might be the case in Germany, where religious cleavage does not run between 
traditionalists and modernists, but rather between traditional Catholics and more progressive Protestants 
(Hien 2013, 455). 
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economic attributes affecting vote choice. In most cases a distinction based on occupation 
or income is drawn between working and middle class and any further categories are 
disregarded (Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995, 151). Recently, however, more sophisticated 
class schemes have been adopted that introduce more detailed differentiation between 
work logic and wealth. Graaf, Heath and Need (2001, 8), for example, distinguished 
among others between service classes, manual classes as well as routine-non manuals and 
petty bourgeoisie. This illustrates how indefinite has been the approach to the meaning of 
class. Does it express the wealth or occupation of a person? I suggest that these two should 
be considered individual components of economic cleavage and class denotes a 
component on its own. Usually as an ambiguous concept, class is largely about 
perceptions. Accordingly, class refers here to subjective perceptions of a person’s socio-
economic status. Social class in this sense follows more classical or Weberian 
interpretation where collective identity and common organization are crucial in defining 
it (Oesch 2008, 331–2). As such, group loyalties rather than strictly structural attributes 
is the phenomenon that defines class status. Various class-based organizations are of 
critical importance in reinforcing class identities and mobilizing their members to support 
specific parties (J. A. J. Evans 2004, 46). Most notable in this context are labor unions 
that have a significant part in mobilizing lower class support for the left. Therefore, voters 
who are considered to belong to lower classes (whether by themselves or others) have 
historically been related to left, whereas upper classes have more reasons to vote for right 
parties.  
Occupation. First studies that examined the link between voters’ economic situation and 
vote preferences focused exclusively on work logic. Class or economic cleavage was 
viewed as a simple distinction between voters who were involved with manual work and 
voters who were engaged in non-manual occupations (Nieuwbeerta 1996, 349–50). As 
previously mentioned, various more detailed categorizations of classes have been 
developed, and these are at least partially concerned with occupation. The main 
innovation that these have introduced is the realization that classes in the sense of 
occupations cannot be ordered from lowest to highest. Such approach recognizes the more 
complex relationship between occupation and work that goes beyond economic self-
interest. On the one hand, people choose professions that coincide with their personalities 
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and mindset, but on the other, work logic also cultivates certain traits and attitudes. This 
is how the twofold causality between occupation and vote choice functions. 
Correspondingly, Kriesi (1998, 169) has distinguished between sociocultural 
professionals and managers, assuming that the former vote for left-libertarian parties, 
while latter support right-authoritarianism largely due to the different characteristic of 
their work. As several studies have revealed, occupation does not have an effect on voting 
behavior only through voters’ social class belonging, but also in terms of work logic. 
Income. While occupational cleavage is about the source of income, income cleavage is 
related instead to the amount of income (Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995, 151). Another 
way to see this distinction is to follow Oesch (2008, 332–3) who differentiated between 
economic and cultural cleavage. While both relate to occupation, economic cleavage in 
Oesch’s terms also concerns the resources that voters possess and their motivation to 
support state intervention in redistribution. Thus, a distinction between occupation and 
income is very relevant when it comes to cleavage voting. On the most basic level, social 
class cleavage (as it has been conventionally understood) is based on the assumption that 
lower income groups vote for the left while voters economically better off support parties 
of the right. In this way, the former group backs financially more redistributive policies, 
while latter opposes them to maintain their advantages (Elff 2009, 297). Thus, from a 
purely rational perspective, there is reason to believe that the income of voters has a 
notable impact on their vote choice. 
Employment sector. In the context of economic cleavage, the employment in public or 
private sector may also have a prominent role in voting preferences. This causality may 
follow two separate logics. First, those employed in public sector are inclined towards 
parties supporting more state involvement and increase in government employment as 
well as growth of state in general, whereas voters engaged in private sector should 
rationally support free enterprise (Brooks, Nieuwbeerta, and Manza 2006, 92; J. A. J. 
Evans 2004, 58). Public sector workers therefore tend to vote for the left, employees of 
private firms prefer parties on the right, an assumption that has found some (although 
limited) empirical support (Kriesi 1998, 170; Oesch 2008, 345). Second, since workers 
involved in public sector are more immediately dependent on government, there is reason 
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to believe that they support currently incumbent parties. Especially higher government 
officials are often appointed by political executives. Either way, public and private sector 
employment has a potential to predispose voters towards certain parties. 
While all the previously described components of economic cleavage function via voters’ 
economic self-interest, their effect on voting has a different magnitude due to different 
ways in which these components function. Perhaps the most relevant aspect of this fact 
concerns the weakening of class component as a predictor of vote choice. Due to changes 
in class structure and employment, “traditional class voting” (Hout, Brooks, and Manza 
1995, 806) that is grounded on simple distinctions between manual and non-manual work, 
but also working and middle class, has become obsolete as more complicated class as 
well as occupation schemes have emerged. In contemporary societies, economic cleavage 
is no longer about lower classes and manual workers voting for left, i.e. wealth and 
income. For instance, studies by Kriesi (1998), Manza, Hout and Brooks (1995) and 
Oesch (2008) have all tested class schemes based on work logic and found them better at 
predicting vote choice than more traditional approaches. At least two developments are 
behind this new reality. First, a “new” middle class has appeared that is more 
heterogeneous than the traditional middle class (Bornschier 2009, 7; Kriesi 1998, 168–
9). Voters belonging to this more contemporary middle class are not assumed to vote for 
the right, but also support progressive and libertarian parties. Second, unskilled workers 
have also become more supportive of the right due to growing affluence (Brooks, 
Nieuwbeerta, and Manza 2006, 113). As a result, a hierarchical ordering of work logic in 
relation to voting is no longer relevant. Thus, it can be argued that a more diverse measure 
of voters’ occupation predicts vote choice more accurately than other components of 
economic cleavage. 
2.1.2. Religious Cleavage 
It has become a common knowledge that religion has lost its relevance in contemporary 
societies, however as noted earlier, it has still been found in some studies to be the best 
predictor of vote choice. Three understandings of what defines this cleavage are 
distinguished here. 
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Practice of religion. One explanation of the significance of religion is related to the 
conflict between secular and religious. As religion has become less relevant, the 
differences in voting behavior have increased between voters who practice religion and 
those who do not. This is especially true for religious voters who feel that their religious 
identity is threatened and find that the process of secularization has advanced too far 
(Brooks, Nieuwbeerta, and Manza 2006, 92–3). Consequently, voters practicing religion 
are expected to vote for parties that represent the moral values held by them, whereas 
common trends should not be prevalent among voters not practicing any religion. 
Subjective religiosity. Another possible reasoning behind the continued salience of 
religion is that it represents moral values that can be very relevant regarding numerous 
prevalent political issues, such as abortion or immigration (van der Brug, Hobolt, and 
Vreese 2009, 1268). People who perceive themselves as religious have reason to support 
parties that are more supportive of policies that uphold religious values and traditions, 
while not necessarily being religious. Although this component is very similar to the 
previously described one, it functions by an altogether different mechanism, emphasizing 
religious sentiment of voters, not their actual religiosity. Voters who do not necessarily 
practice any religion, but support religious values very likely vote for parties representing 
respective beliefs, while voters distancing themselves from religion can also be expected 
to oppose any religious sentiment and parties representing these. 
Religious denomination. Religious cleavage lines do not only run along the secular-
religious conflict, but party choice may also differ among voters belonging to different 
religious subgroups. In case of Christian confessions, studies have come to somewhat 
contrasting conclusions. While Protestants have been found to be more supportive of 
right-wing and conservative parties when compared to Catholics (Andersen and Heath 
2003, 318), religious denomination has arguably largest impact on vote choice in Catholic 
as well as in religiously diverse societies (Knutsen and Scarbrough 1995, 503). The 
likelihood of adherents to these different confessions voting for Christian democratic 
parties has also revealed varying patters in different countries (Best 2011, 287). Although 
it is unclear which denominations are more supportive of religious parties, groups 
differing along this division can be assumed to develop different voting behavior. 
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Particularly in countries where opposition between different religions is a major line of 
conflict are voters expected to express such controversies at the ballot box in search of a 
political recognition of their own beliefs. 
Yet, with the expansion of secularism everywhere there is reason to expect this division 
between different religious denominations to be substituted with a secular-religious 
divide. As societies are becoming more secular, oppositions between religious and non-
religious voters can be assumed to become more relevant than those among religious 
voters. Dalton (1996, 327) in his cross-country analysis of cleavages has concluded that 
the latter split between voters in terms of church attendance has much more influence on 
party choice in nearly every industrialized democracy. Since I suggest that voting 
behavior is most immediately influenced by attitudes, I also argue that subjective 
religiosity has a stronger impact on vote choice. Even though the increased relevance of 
a secular and religious divide might not be true for more traditional societies, a subjective 
religiosity should predict vote choice more accurately than other components of religious 
cleavage. 
2.1.3. Residential cleavage 
Area in which voters live may have a substantial effect on their voting behavior. Such 
differences were one of the central conflicts that defined the frozen party systems 
according to Lipset and Rokkan, who distinguished between economic or class and 
cultural or national oppositions that were expressed in relation to territory (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967, 41). Accordingly, there are two distinct ways to perceive the residential 
cleavage. 
Urbanization. Economic as well as cultural and social differences between urban and rural 
areas are still relevant, although perhaps not so significant as in the past. Historically, the 
divide in economic terms is illustrated by the existence of agrarian parties representing 
rural areas and parties of the left supported by lower class workers. This assumption has 
also been confirmed by findings that class divide in left vote has been more salient in 
urban areas (Johnston 1985, 247) where the class conflict is more prominent. Rural 
regions are commonly more traditional, especially in terms of moral issues, and in this 
respect they can be opposed to urban areas. It can thus be assumed that rural voters tend 
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to support right-conservative parties while in urban areas progressive left gains more 
support. 
Regionalism. Roughly for the same reasons that countries differ from each other 
regarding cleavages in voting, territories within a country also can also be expected to 
vary in party support. Social networks of voters living in the same area blends their 
attitudes and creates a common identity but historically evolved regional peculiarities are 
significant as well (J. A. J. Evans 2004, 47). Andersen and Heath (2003) have proposed 
that regions rather than countries should be used as unit of analysis when examining 
political cleavages and other studies that have included regions in their inquiry of 
cleavages have also revealed regional variation in a number of countries (Johnston 1985; 
Roper and Fesnic 2003). However, it can conversely be argued that regional effects are 
too often cited when other factors fail to explain variation among regions (Gidengil 1989, 
564–5). Nevertheless, due to variation between regions of countries and contrasting 
political conflicts within them, voters in different regions very likely express different 
patterns of party choice, which should thus be considered as a separate mechanism of 
cleavage voting. 
As a result of already mentioned changes in class structure and employment but also the 
blurring of distinctions between the traditional political left and right, the political 
divisions between urban and rural areas are expected to decrease. Although the very same 
can be said about regional differences, these are likely to be less affected. Regional splits 
encompass political oppositions that continue to be relevant, while agrarian as well as 
traditional left parties that represent the urban versus rural divide have witnessed a 
decline. Therefore, regional differences are expected to predict vote choice more 
accurately than urbanization. 
2.1.4. National cleavage 
Territorial oppositions are according to Lipset and Rokkan only one expression of strains 
created by national revolutions. Perhaps more salient from regional antagonisms in this 
context are conflicting national identities. The opposition between nation-building central 
culture and peripheral identities (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 41) is not only a thing of the 
past but might as well be still relevant today. Nationality is here considered to be 
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expressed by two components. 
Ethnicity. Ethnic origin has a highly significant part in the formation of national identity. 
It has a high potential to polarize societies since ethnic divisions very often involve not 
only strong group oppositions but also distinct socio-economic differences (Dalton 1996, 
329). Ethnic minorities are often economically disfavored and have been found to be more 
supportive of left-wing parties (Andersen and Heath 2003, 320; Heath et al. 2011, 265–
6). Yet, ethnicity is very likely to influence vote choice without these latter reinforcing 
differences. The tendency of ethnic minorities to vote for the left may also be interpreted 
as support for more solidarity and equality between different ethnicities and as such 
motivated by an attempt to protect their own ethnic identity. The existence and popularity 
of ethnic and extreme right-wing parties also suggests that voters may regard ethnicity as 
a point of departure when casting a vote. Ethnic belonging may therefore lead to different 
patterns of voting.  
Language. Another attribute that promotes national cleavage is language. Language may 
be regarded as “one of the principal building blocks of nationalism” (Lijphart 1979, 453), 
since it creates common networks and distinguishes nations from one another. Even 
though in many societies language corresponds to ethnicity, this is not necessarily always 
the case7. In similar ways that ethnic groups may seek political representation, speakers 
of a certain language may also pursue their linguistic or cultural privileges. In his study 
of four linguistically divided countries, Lijphart (1979) concluded that although language 
is the strongest predictor of vote only in South Africa, it is still overall more relevant than 
class. Linguistic differences may thus provide important cues for party choice, even in 
ethnically homogenous societies. 
There is, however, reason to assume that ethnicity entails more significant incentives 
regarding voting behavior. According to a study by Heath et al. (2011), even voters who 
                                                 
7 For example, in Canada language has a notable effect on class cleavage as francohpne voters show 
different patters of voting compared to English-speakers (Gidengil 1989, 585–6), while a common way 
there to identifiy oneself is Canadian rather than French or English. 
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belong to a minority group but have become fluent in a majority language are still more 
similar to those belonging to the original minority group in terms of turnout. This implies 
that even when linguistic divide is overcome, ethnic differences nonetheless remain 
important for national identification. Ethnicity can simply involve a wider range of 
cultural particularities, whereas language is only a single feature. Thus, it is suggested 
here that ethnicity predicts vote choice more accurately than language. 
2.1.5. Value cleavage 
In addition to the four previously described cleavages that are usually perceived to be 
rooted in social structure, a cleavage that is more immediately linked to attitudes is also 
considered here. The fact that it is not represented by a single social attribute is one of the 
reasons why the value cleavage is often not recognized as an actual full-fledged cleavage 
(Knutsen and Scarbrough 1995, 497; Kriesi 2010, 679). It lacks a clear structural basis 
that distinguishes voters in their party choice and there is usually no common 
identification or organization of voters holding common values. However, according to 
the concept of cleavages employed here, value divide is deemed to constitute a cleavage 
since it should theoretically be linked to party choice. The mechanism behind the 
increasing importance of value cleavage is fairly simple. As social cleavages weaken due 
to social as well as geographical mobility, voters begin to relate to those holding similar 
attitudes and value orientations rather than receiving their electoral cues from people who 
they share only their position in the social structure. Interactions with those holding 
similar values and less contact with people maintaining different values further reinforces 
the gap in voting behavior based on values. Kriesi (2010) has provided several examples 
from the literature of different dimensions of value cleavage, such as Green-alternative-
libertarian vs traditional-authoritarian-nationalist or libertarian-universalistic vs 
traditionalist-communitarian. Most parsimonious and universal distinction is however 
based on two simple elements: post-materialism and libertarianism. 
Post-materialism. The post-materialist component of the value cleavage has its roots in 
the theories of value change and modernization as posited by Inglehart and Welzel (2005), 
who drew attention to the polarization between materialist and post-materialist values. As 
a consequence of increased existential security and material well-being in post-industrial 
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societies, a generational change is now taking place that results in emphasis on self-
expression, subjective well-being and quality of life, rather than purely material issues 
(Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 52–3). New important issues appear on the political arena, 
such as environmental protection, women’s rights and political participation. This trend 
entails a significant change especially for the political left that represents post-materialist 
value orientations on these matters, whereas the party choice of materialists still depends 
on their economic and social situation (Elff 2007). There is thus reason to believe that 
post-materialist voters tend to be more supportive of the left that represents post-
materialist values. 
Libertarianism. Although the libertarian-authoritarian dichotomy can easily be placed on 
the same scale as the post-material-material divide, it involves a different approach to the 
value cleavage. The latter can be viewed as a conflict over the role of community that is 
largely focused on cultural issues and involved with questions of hierarchy and tolerance 
(Kriesi 2010, 680–1). While libertarians favor tolerance, equality and freedom of thought, 
voters with authoritarian attitudes prefer strict social hierarchy and submission to the 
dominant norms. Voters holding libertarian values prefer parties representing cultural 
diversity and individual autonomy, whereas authoritarians tend to support parties 
endorsing cultural homogeneity and national delineation (Oesch 2008, 333–4). These 
value orientations rather accurately correspond to the political left and right, which 
suggests that libertarian voters vote for leftist parties as authoritarian voters support 
parties of the right.  
As such, the libertarianist element is fairly limited as it expresses only one narrow value 
divide, while the post-materialist division encompasses differentiations based on a 
number of issues and attitudes. While explicitly highlighting a particular aspect of it, the 
libertarian-authoritarian divide can be considered as an attribute of post-materialist split, 
since post-materialist values emphasize tolerance and equality. For this reason the post-
materialist element should be better able to predict vote choice. 
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2.2. Differences in cleavage voting between world’s regions 
Party systems have not appeared and developed in a similar way in every political system. 
Rather, they have emerged under very different conditions and are at least to some extent 
dependent on the varying composition of social structure. In line with the theoretical 
literature on social cleavages, not least important is the level of economic as well as social 
and political development of a country. In terms of such path dependency approach, the 
timing and degree of democratization and its requirements are also often noted to have a 
critical part in shaping the nature of cleavage voting8. In particular, the behavior of new 
electorates is relevant here. In recently established democracies, voters lack the long-
established party attachments that would result in freezing of party systems and group 
patterns in voting behavior (Dalton 1996, 339). Consequently, cleavage voting should 
remain weak in new democracies. 
Still, it often occurs that newfound democratic regimes have experienced democratic rule 
during some period in the past. Latin America provides a number of examples of this. 
Countries such as Columbia, Uruguay and Chile have party systems that have not gone 
through a significant change since their first encounters with democracy and thus a 
freezing of party systems can be examined in these cases (Bornschier 2009, 8). However, 
this does not inevitably imply a high level of cleavage voting as also does not the mere 
existence of strong social divisions. Despite widespread economic inequality and 
unionization, class voting in Latin America has found to be relatively weak (Bellucci and 
Heath 2012, 111). Moreover, class-based parties are uncommon, which might be the result 
of a top-down founding of party systems where elites sought to form coalitions rather 
than accentuating strong cleavage lines that reflect social divisions (Bornschier 2009, 8). 
Simply put, the economic divide has not been politicized. Relative religious homogeneity 
furthermore suggests that religion should not be an important predictor of party choice in 
this region. In spite of differences between the countries in Latin America, cleavage 
                                                 
8 Lipset and Rokkan (1967) emphasize the process of democratic transition and the consequent political 
conflicts in the founding of party systems. See also Bornsheir (2009, 8–9), Evans (2004, 48) and Dalton 
(1996, 339). 
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voting can be expected to be rather weak in that region in general, which should be 
especially true for economic and religious voting.  
Another set of reestablished democracies that have a historical experience with party 
politics are post-socialist countries, but for an altogether different reason. These countries 
have recently undergone a transition from socialism to liberal-democracy which meant 
an extreme reorganizing of not only political system, but also social structure. On the one 
hand, the inherent nature and duration of socialist regimes imply a low level of class and 
religious voting under the succeeding regimes (van der Brug 2010, 602; Zielinski 2002, 
185). Socialist regimes sought to eliminate all class and religious differences and were 
rather successful at abolishing private property and thus property-owning classes. Class 
and religious differences under such conditions should then not divide voters in their party 
choice. On the other hand, even political systems with previous experience of party 
politics require a basis for political conflict and social divisions provide a fairly 
straightforward instrument for this purpose (G. Evans 2000, 410). Social and religious 
distinctions in particular are simple cues for voters. Considering the often radical 
transformation of economic systems and resulting inequalities, economic divide might 
have become the most relevant explanation for party choice in post-socialist regimes. This 
latter assumption has not been confirmed, however. Roper and Fesnic (2003) in their 
analysis of Romania and Ukraine found that historical legacy is far more significant in 
determining voting patterns than socio-economic variables. Structural attributes do not 
explain the reform-mindedness of voters as might be expected in such transitional 
contexts. Similar conclusion has been made by van der Brug (2010, 596), who was unable 
to demonstrate significant differences in cleavage voting between Western and Eastern 
European countries. Nonetheless, there is a theoretical basis to the claim that cleavages 
are not a strong explanation for party choice in post-socialist countries. 
In addition to the political and social changes, economic development can also be 
considered to influence the nature of cleavage voting in a country. This is above all 
relevant in the context of class cleavage as industrialization has completely rearranged 
the class structure in many countries. As previously mentioned, the traditional distinction 
between classes involved with manual work and those occupied with non-manual work 
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is no longer appropriate. This is particularly true for post-industrial societies where not 
only the proportions between the two classes have changed, but also their political 
predispositions (Nieuwbeerta 1996, 361). There is thus reason to believe that 
industrialization tends to rearrange cleavage structures that define the political behavior 
of voters. Moreover, it can be argued that such development rearranges the relationships 
between cleavages themselves. According to the theory of value change, voters in 
industrialized societies are putting more emphasis on non-material values and issues due 
to the increase in physical and material security (Elff 2007).  This trend suggests that in 
industrialized countries party choice is decreasingly explainable by more traditional 
divides such as class and religion, whereas the value cleavage is becoming more relevant. 
Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995) have hypothesized that the impact of social structure on 
voting in advanced industrial societies is weakening while the influence of value 
orientations is increasing. They were only able to find some support to the second 
hypothesis and concluded that the impact of value orientations tends to increase relative 
to the influence of structural variables (Knutsen and Scarbrough 1995, 511). However, 
their study only included already highly industrialized countries and the comparison of 
more different societies might show a more contrasting picture. In any case, in more 
industrialized countries the effect of social structure on party choice is expected to be 
lower and value cleavage more prominent. 
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 Measuring cleavage voting 
3.1. Considerations of measurement 
The concept of cleavage voting is far from being well-defined and this fact becomes quite 
obvious when various empirical studies on this phenomena are considered. As pointed 
out earlier, especially the works involved with the question of whether cleavages are in 
decline or not have reached very diverging conclusions. These disagreements can be at 
least in part attributed to “an undertheorized concept of class” (Hout, Brooks, and Manza 
1995, 805) or any other social divide in that respect, but not only inconsistent definitions 
and conceptualization are the root of the problem. Although in cleavage voting research 
empirical techniques have always tended to precede theory and theory has “lagged behind 
measurement and modeling” (G. Evans 2000, 412), different operationalizations, data and 
statistical methods have also contributed to the confusions concerning the trends in 
cleavage voting (Best 2011, 283; Kriesi 1998, 166). Consequently, the assumptions that 
have been made about cleavage voting in different studies are only valid for the exact 
concept of cleavage as well as cleavage voting measured, depending on operationalization 
and methodology. Even though majority of studies on cleavage voting have focused on 
post-industrial countries with established democratic regimes, even variation among these 
seemingly homogenous societies is notable9. The results of measuring cleavage voting 
are thus highly influenced by data employed, and also in terms of time period that it 
convers. Some of these issues then deserve a more thorough enquiry and clarification 
here. 
3.1.1. Traditional and total cleavage voting 
The key point of departure in operationalizing cleavage voting is defining the link 
between voters representing certain cleavages and parties. Particularly evident is this 
respect are the contrasting approaches to class voting. Hout, Brooks and Manza (1995, 
809) propose a useful distinction between traditional and total class voting. Such 
distinction is applicable to any divide in voting behavior, not only class. In case of 
                                                 
9 See for instance Dalton (1996), Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995) and Nieuwbeerta (1996). 
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traditional class voting, blue-collar classes are strictly assumed to vote for the left whereas 
white-collar classes expected to prefer right-leaning parties and only these two conditions 
express class voting. Total class voting is in contrast simple and far less rigid as it is 
defined as any kind of statistical association between class and voting behavior. This 
difference in approaches to class cleavage has also been mentioned by Oesch (2008, 330) 
who noted that some scholars tend to see class voting as working class supporting left, 
while other perceive it simply as systematic links between different classes and parties. 
The latter interpretation has a critical shortcoming in that it disregards measuring a strictly 
theoretical association and also takes into account correlations that are merely random. 
Total class voting then rules out a differentiation between negative and positive class 
voting (Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995, 152) which would allow to reveal “correct” class 
voting. I argue that such strict approach to cleavage voting as the traditional approaches 
to cleavage voting assume strongly limits the phenomenon and excludes an important part 
of patterns in voting behavior that could be otherwise observed. The narrowness of this 
approach is even more relevant in case of other cleavages than class. For instance, linking 
some employment sectors or languages to certain parties is rather questionable and 
examining any statistical relation in cases as such is not only more appropriate, but often 
the only option. Thus, here the total cleavage voting approach is taken. 
3.1.2. Absolute and relative cleavage voting 
Another caveat in measuring cleavage voting lies in how the magnitude of the relationship 
is understood, which largely concerns the method of estimating the association between 
a cleavage and party choice. Broadly speaking, absolute and relative measures of cleavage 
voting can be distinguished (Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995, 141–3). In the former case, 
the proportion of voters casting a “correct” vote is calculated and this might be measured 
relative to the voters voting “incorrectly”, whereas relative approaches instead consider 
the predictive power of a cleavage and not only the gross effects. Consequently, the 
absolute measures are somewhat more susceptible to differences in the overall popularity 
of parties (Nieuwbeerta 1996, 346) and also to variation in cleavage structures (J. A. J. 
Evans 2004, 54; Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995, 152). In the context of the decline of 
cleavages, the causes behind this phenomena can be related to structural dealignment, 
which indicates a decrease in the size of a social group, or behavioral dealignment that 
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entails a disruption of the links between a cleavage and respective party (Bornschier 2009, 
4).  For instance, the number of religious voters might have decreased and as a result, 
religious parties may be less popular, but religion may now be a much better predictor of 
vote choice since only religious voters keep supporting religious parties. Accordingly, De 
Graaf, Heath and Need (2001, 4) have highlighted the necessity to distinguish between 
compositional changes and changes in group solidarity and in the same vein Best (2011, 
285) has argued that the proper measurement of electoral relevance of cleavages takes 
into account not only the loyalty, but also the size and turnout a cleavage group. Thus, the 
difference between the two approaches comes down to whether the goal is to measure the 
explanatory power of cleavages or their absolute impact on the outcomes of voting. Here 
the former approach is followed and the measurement of cleavage voting is focused on 
the predictive power of cleavages regarding party choice. 
3.1.3. Bivariate and multivariate models 
 It has also been suggested by a number of authors10 that the measurement of cleavage 
voting should not be limited to bivariate analysis, but employ a research design that allows 
the inclusion of several variables in addition to the cleavage examined. It is important to 
consider the issues of endogeneity since all social cleavage variables are after all at the 
beginning of the causal chain leading to party choice and the relationship is mediated by 
more proximate variables such as attitudes and ideological predispositions (Raymond 
2011, 132). Moreover, cleavages themselves may be interrelated in explaining voting 
behavior (Brooks, Nieuwbeerta, and Manza 2006, 93–4). For example, a bivariate 
analysis may demonstrate a strong association between religious cleavage and party 
choice, while this relationship may rather be the consequence of religious voters 
belonging to certain social classes and thus instead be the effect of economic cleavage. 
Conversely, Evans (2000, 412) has argued that including only a single independent 
variable is not necessarily a problem and multivariate models may render the causality 
redundantly vague. Returning to the previous example, class may explain the relationship 
between religion and party choice, but this does not change the fact that there are clear 
                                                 
10 See Brooks and Manza (1997, 939), Gidengil (1989, 567) and Hout, Brooks and Manza (1995, 806). 
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patterns of religious voters supporting only certain parties and thus constituting a 
cleavage. While such reasoning may be convincing, disregarding the complex and 
composite link between cleavages and party choice will very likely overestimate the 
effect of social cleavages. Here the necessity of multivariate analysis is taken into 
account. Although the impact of cleavages on voting behavior is not combined in a single 
model and thus measured as such, several control variables are nevertheless considered. 
Following some previous attempts to measure cleavage voting11, the effects gender, age 
and education are included in the models measuring the impact of cleavages on party 
choice. 
3.1.4. Level of measurement 
Classic empirical works on class voting adopted a dichotomous measurement of class as 
well as party choice: voters belong to manual or non-manual class and parties respectively 
represented the left and right end of political spectrum. On the individual level, cleavages 
are clearly not strictly twofold and voters may have intermediary positions, but in terms 
of political behavior they tend to be manifested as dualistic oppositions according to Elff 
(Elff 2007). For instance, there may be various categories of social classes and religiosity, 
but ultimately in a political contest, some will be pitted against others. However, as in 
case of traditional cleavage voting, a dichotomous measurement of cleavages and political 
outcomes is also an oversimplification. Such dualistic approach to cleavages blends 
together possibly very different categories or categories where detailed distinction is 
highly significant and may lead to inaccurate conclusions as demonstrated by Manza, 
Hout and Brooks (1995, 147). The same is true for party choice. Not only is it difficult 
and often incorrect to dichotomize parties into two categories (Korpi 1972, 635), the left-
right dimension may no longer accurately describe political conflict. Parties have 
converged on the left-right scale dimension and such perception is not relevant in case of 
new political issues as Van der Brug has suggested (2010, 589). These issues become 
                                                 
11 Some examples include Andersen and Yaish (2003, 409) who addd in their analysis gender, age, 
education and locality; Hout, Brooks and Manza (1995, 810) who considered gender, race, region, age and 
education as covariates; and Oesch (2008, 341) who introduced education, gender, age and public sector 
emplyment as controls. 
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particularly substantial in cross-national studies where a large number of very different 
societies as well as political systems are compared. For these reasons here a dichotomous 
measurement of cleavages and parties is avoided while all other levels of measurement 
for variables are employed.  
3.2. Methods of measurement 
First major attempt at measuring cleavage voting that provided truly comparable data was 
Alford index of class voting that for a long time remained the standard measure of this 
phenomenon (Nieuwbeerta 1996, 349). This was largely due to the minimalism and 
technical simplicity of the measure, which was especially relevant at a time when data 
was scarce and electronic analysis of that data limited. The calculation of the Alford index 
is rather straightforward: the “percentage of persons in the non-manual occupations 
voting for Left parties” is subtracted from the “percentage of persons in non-manual 
occupations voting for Left parties” (Korpi 1972, 628). As such, it is based on a plain 
cross tabulation and can be perceived as the distinctiveness of manual workers from non-
manual workers regarding their propensity to vote for Left. However, the measure does 
not have to be limited to class voting. For instance, Lijphart (1979, 444) has demonstrated 
that the Alford index can be used to estimate voting based on religion and language by 
aggregating these two variables as well as respective parties into two categories. For 
reasons already discussed, this measure is clearly too simple, mainly because it requires 
the dichotomization of variables. The first major improvement was Thomsen index that 
substituted the subtraction in the Alford’s index with calculating the odds of one group 
voting for a certain party in relation to another group voting for the same party. Logistic 
regression and other methods based on the odds-ratio have now become the standard 
instrument in cleavage voting analysis. These measures allow the inclusion of several 
voting outcomes and categories of cleavages and also examine the influence of several 
independent variables. According to Evans (2000, 408), they also estimate the strength of 
cleavage voting independently from the overall popularity of parties and differences in 
the sizes of cleavage groups. Most notable improvement to the odds-ratio is perhaps the 
intricate Kappa index introduced by Hout, Brooks and Manza (1995, 813) that is defined 
as the “standard deviation of class differences in vote choice in a given election”.  
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This Kappa index is estimated by making use of multinomial logistic regression (MLR) 
model, which has also been used in some more recent works12, albeit in a quite different 
manner. Compared to most other probability models, MLR models are not as restrictive 
regarding the use of lower levels of measurement. Such models enable the prediction of 
more than two possible outcomes and dependent variable may have several categories 
that cannot be ordered in any meaningful way. This is a crucial condition for measuring 
the impact of cleavages on party choice, since the latter variable needs to be nominal if 
more than two parties are included in the analysis. A number of estimates can be obtained 
from the calculation of an MLR model that indicate the strength of association between 
variables involved. The regression coefficient, which in case of logistic regression models 
expresses the odds ratio, is an interpretable measure and can be used to assess the 
probability of a certain cleavage group member to vote for a certain party. However, 
measures that estimate how well a model performs can also be used. In this case, two 
methods have been employed to measure model performance in analyses of cleavage 
voting, namely likelihood-ratio test and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) statistic. 
Although both are based on the likelihood function, they are still often used 
simultaneously13 as the two methods have different implications and advantages. As 
Nieuwbeerta (Nieuwbeerta 1996) has suggested, unlike likelihood-ratio test, the BIC 
statistic penalizes the estimation for adding more parameters, but as result it is biased 
against indicating a better performance of a model.  
Here, model performance is estimated in order to assess the strength of cleavages. 
However, neither the likelihood-ratio test nor BIC statistic is used here. Instead, cleavage 
strength is reported using multiple pseudo-R2 statistics that provide a straightforward and 
concise expression of model performance, which is crucial when a large number of 
models needs to be compared. These measures, like the previous two, are based on 
likelihood function and it indicates how much a model including predictors is improved 
                                                 
12 See Andersen and Yaish (2003), Brooks, Nieuwbeerta and Manza (2006) and Jansen, De Graaf and Need 
(2011) 
13 See for example Hout, Brooks and Manza (1995), Nieuwbeerta, De Graaf and Ultee (Nieuwbeerta, de 
Graaf, and Ultee 2000) and Nieuwbeerta (1996). 
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over the model without predictors.  In other words, pseudo-R2 statistics measure the 
strength of association between predictors and the outcome, i.e. independent variables 
representing a cleavage and dependent variable representing party choice in this context. 
As such, the calculation of these statistics is essentially similar to likelihood-ratio test. A 
number of pseudo-R2 measures have been created but the most basic among these is the 
McFadden’s pseudo-R2. This “likelihood-ratio index” as labeled by McFadden (1978, 
306) is defined by the following formula: 
𝑅𝑀
2 = 1 −
𝐿
𝐿0
 
where L is the log likelihood of the full model and L0 is the log likelihood of the null 
model that only includes the intercept as a predictor. As follows, the result is 
mathematically bounded between 0 and 1 and the more the model is improved by the 
independent variables in the model, the higher is the value of the pseudo-R2 statistic. 
While analogous to the R2 of ordinary least squares regression, pseudo-R2 cannot be 
interpreted in any meaningful way in relation to data. Moreover, unlike the conventional 
R2, the simple McFadden’s pseudo-R2 never reaches 1 and its interpretation is different 
in that values as low as 0.2 to 0.4 already represent “an excellent fit” of a model 
(McFadden 1978, 307). These values correspond to the values of about 0.4 to 0.8 of  the 
conventional R2 and there is a relatively stable empirical relationship between the 
conventional R2 and this pseudo-R2 measure (Domencich and McFadden 1975, 124). 
Unfortunately, due to this asymmetry, comprehending the value of this statistic is 
complicated and McFadden’s pseudo-R2 does not penalize a model for including too 
many variables. Adjusted version of McFadden’s pseudo- R2 however does this: 
𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑗
2 = 1 −
𝐿 − 𝑘
𝐿0
 
where L is again the log likelihood of the full model, L0 the log likelihood of the null 
model and k represents the number of predictors in the model. For every predictor that 
does not significantly add to the model, the value of adjusted McFadden’s pseudo-R2 is 
decreased. Reading of this statistic is still somewhat complicated. For a more 
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straightforward reading of the statistic, a more complex Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 
(Nagelkerke 1991) will be also used here and this is generalized as follows: 
𝑅𝑁
2 =
1 − (
𝐿0
𝐿 )
2
𝑛
1 − 𝐿0
2
𝑛
 
where L and L0 again represent the log likelihoods of the full and null model respectively 
and n the number of observations used for calculation. According to Nagelkerke (1991, 
691–2), this measure is consistent with the conventional R2 and can be interpreted in a 
similar way: it is the “proportion of explained variation”. Although with methods based 
on the odds-ratio caution is needed with such interpretation, the fact that the Nagelkerke 
pseudo-R2 ranges symmetrically from 0 to 1 means it is easier to comprehend. 
Additionally, it is independent of the sample size as well as units used.  
Thus, the pseudo-R2 measures used here are universal statistics that describe how well 
models perform in the sense that they do not require that the compared models were 
nested. While McFadden’s pseudo-R2 is rather basic, its adjusted version takes into 
account the number of predictors. Likewise, Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 is controls for the 
number of observations in a model and is simple to read. As such, taking all of these three 
statistics as reference point when comparing models allows for more comprehensive 
examination of data. For this reason, instead of utilizing a single measure, all three 
pseudo-R2 measures are considered in the comparison of models in the analysis of results. 
Only when all three of these statistics suggest the better performance of one model over 
another, can some cleavages or components of cleavages with certainty assumed to be 
more relevant than others. 
3.3. Model design 
In order to calculate the association between cleavages and party choice, three types of 
models are developed. All of these are MLR models based on the odds-ratios. First, the 
effect of some basic social attributes must be isolated from the effect that cleavage has on 
voting behavior. It also allows the assessment of to what extent the inclusion of cleavage 
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components improves the performance of model. For these reasons, a base model is 
calculated that includes only three previously determined control variables, namely age, 
gender and education, and models their effect on party choice. The form of this model is 
following: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑗𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑗𝐸𝑖 
where yij is the expected probability that respondent i will vote for party j and A is the 
age, G is the gender and E is the educational level of the respondent i.  
Second, to determine which component of a cleavage is best associated with party choice, 
component model needs to be fitted the data.  In order to take into account the effect of 
the control variables, these are maintained in the model and a component variable is 
inserted. This is simple with models to which an interval, ordinal or ratio variable is 
added: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑗𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑗𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑗𝑂𝑖 
where the Oi indicates a cleavage component value of respondent i that is measured on 
interval, ordinal or ratio scale. When variables that can only be measured categorically 
are included as component variables, each category of such variable is simply treated as 
a separate dichotomous variable. 
Third, for the comparison of how strongly different cleavages are associated with party 
choice, all the components of a respective cleavage need to be combined in a single 
cleavage model for each cleavage. Thus, this model is analogous to the previous ones and 
the variables added to the base model depend on what kind of components the respective 
cleavage consists of. The exact form of cleavage model includes components, which are 
outlined in previous and described in this section. 
3.4. Data 
Some studies that have attempted to measure cleavage voting have applied various 
national data sets. Others have used cross-national surveys, most notably 
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Eurobarometer14, but also European Values Survey, European Electoral Studies and 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. These are frequently used in combination in 
order to analyze and compare different variables and populations. These data sets are 
appropriate for examining longitudinal trends in certain countries and measuring the 
effect of social class on voting behavior. Thus, such data is useful for assessments of the 
decline of class voting in advanced industrial societies that a substantial part of the 
research on cleavage voting has been involved with. Most of these data sets are however 
very limited in geographical scope and electoral data on countries outside Northern 
America and Europe is scarce. An important exception is World Values Survey carried 
out by World Values Survey Association (2014) and this data is used here. This is 
motivated by the fact that WVS data sets include a considerable number of different 
countries and variables and these are measures consistently throughout time periods and 
countries. The WVS research project has surveyed people’s values and beliefs together 
with their socio-economic attributes since 1981 in almost 100 countries and has thus 
gathered comprehensive data for analyzing cleavage voting in very different political 
systems. For the analysis here, the third release of 6th wave of WVS is applied. The survey 
of the 6th wave was conducted between 2010 and 2014 and the third release includes data 
on the populations of 59 countries. Because the question on respondents’ vote choice was 
not asked in all of these countries, only respondents in 50 countries are included in the 
analysis.  
3.5. Operationalization of variables 
All the variables are operationalized according to the questions posed in the WVS 6th 
wave questionnaire and possible answers, i.e. how the variables are constructed in the 
data set. This section gives an overview of how the party choice, control variables and 
cleavage components are linked to the variables in the data set. 
Party choice. In the literature concerning cleavage voting, three distinct theoretical 
                                                 
14 Examples of studies on cleavage voting that have employed Eurobarometer data include Bellucci and 
Heath (2012), Best (2011), Elff (Elff 2007, 2009), Knutsen (1988) and Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995). 
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approaches to measuring which party a respondent supports can be found. Most 
unambiguous way to measure party choice is by the particular party a respondent voted 
for in the most recent elections, since it reflects the direct political outcomes of voting 
This approach has been taken by Andersen and Yaish (2003). Also valid would be to 
consider it as the party that a respondent would vote for if there was an election taking 
place in the near future and this is how it has been understood by Oesch (2008). Most 
inaccurate of the three would be to assess which party a respondent supports or leans 
toward. At least in theory party identification is somewhat imprecise measure of party 
choice, but has nevertheless been consistently used and shown to conform to voting 
intentions (Oesch 2008, 335–6). Here the second of these possibilities is followed and 
party choice is quantified as the answer to the question “If there were a national election 
tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote for?” (Question V228 in the 
questionnaire). As follows, party choice is measured as a nominal variable and its 
categories represent particular parties. This is in contrast to many previous works where 
party choice is measured indirectly15. The approach taken here most accurately reflects 
the choice a voter has at the ballot box and is thus most valid among other possibilities. 
An important caveat has to be noted, however. Since the number of parties included in 
the data sets of some countries is relatively large, only the voters of 9 most popular parties 
in each country are analyzed. The observations excluded on this basis constitute a 
negligible part of the data set. 
Control variables. The operationalization of the three control variables is fairly 
straightforward. Gender (V240) is coded as dummy variable for male. Age (V242) is an 
answer to a question about respondent’s age and is coded as age in years. Education of a 
respondent is determined by her answer to the question about her highest level of 
education attained (V248) and this is coded on 9 levels with no formal education being 
                                                 
15 Party choice has previously been evaluated according to political orientations of parties (Andersen and 
Heath 2003; Elff 2009; Jansen, De Graaf, and Need 2011), classifying parties as left and right (Brooks and 
Manza 1997; Nieuwbeerta, de Graaf, and Ultee 2000) or associating parties with certain party families 
(Brooks, Nieuwbeerta, and Manza 2006; Graaf, Heath, and Need 2001). 
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the lowest value and university-level education the highest. 
Economic cleavage. Class voting has traditionally been understood to separate lower 
classes from the middle and upper classes and characterized by lower-income groups 
voting for different parties than others (Lijphart 1979, 443). Here the subjective social 
class variable is assessed more detail. It is determined by respondent’s assessment of her 
class belonging (V238) and measured on 5 levels where extremes are represented by 
lower and upper class. Income is also based on respondent’s subjective assessment 
(V239) and coded as 10 different income groups. In addition to status, class voting has 
also been understood as expressed by work logic and manual workers have been 
distinguished from other voters. More recent research has applied different class 
schemes16. Unfortunately the 2010-2014 WVS survey did not ask directly about 
respondent’s occupation, but includes questions about the work characteristic of 
respondents. Occupation variable is therefore created using three variables in the data set 
that describe respondent’s work. These determine whether respondent’s work involves 
manual or intellectual tasks (V231), routine or creative tasks (V232) and whether or not 
respondent has independence performing her tasks at work (V233). These work profiles 
for identifying different categories are similar to those outlined by Evans (2004, 61–2). 
All three variables are measured on a 10 point scale. In order to create one latent 
occupation variable, these three are first transformed into dichotomous variables 
representing the two extremes and then coded into a nominal occupation variable that has 
eight categories representing each combination of these three dichotomous variables. 
Employment sector variable is determined by whether respondent currently worked or 
had been worked for public, business or non-profit organization (V230) and is thus a 
                                                 
16 Probably most popular in recent cleavage voting reseach has been the Erikson–Goldthorpe–Portocarero 
(EGP) class scheme that has been applied in different adaptations by Andersen and Yaish (2003), Andersen 
and Heath (2003), Brooks and Manza (1997), Brooks, Nieuwbeerta and Manza (2006), De Graaf, Heath 
and Need (2001), Hout, Books and Manza (1995) and Nieuwbeerta, De Graaf and Ultee (Nieuwbeerta, de 
Graaf, and Ultee 2000). Others have developed their own class schemes (Oesch 2008) or followed the 
categories of the data set used (Elff 2009). 
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nominal variable including three categories. 
Religious cleavage. In previous research on religious voting, religious cleavage has 
commonly been evaluated as practice of religion or as belonging to a religious 
denomination, in which case Protestants and Catholics are usually distinguished. 
Sometimes it is assessed even as a blend of these measures in order to separately examine 
different combinations (Andersen and Heath 2003, 305; Best 2011, 287). Here these 
elements of religious cleavage are individually assessed and the dualistic approach to 
religiosity is avoided. Practice of religion is quantified as the frequency of attending 
religious services apart from weddings and funerals (V145) and is measured on a scale 
from never to more than once a week. Subjective religiosity is determined by respondent’s 
assessment of whether she is a religious person, not a religious person or an atheist (V147) 
and used respectively as an ordinal variable. Religious denomination (V144) is measured 
as a nominal variable with respondents not belonging to any religion excluded from 
analysis. 
Residential cleavage. This is assessed according to two components: urbanization and 
region. Whether the respondent resides in an urban or rural area is evaluated by the size 
of town where the interview with respondent was conducted (V253) and coded as ordinal 
variable with eight levels. Region of residence is also evaluated by the location where the 
survey was conducted (V256), but this is measured as a nominal variable.  
National cleavage. There is a certain enticement to perceive the components defining 
national cleavage as dichotomous, since according to Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 14) an 
important line of conflict in party systems has historically ran between the “central nation-
building culture and the increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or 
religiously distinct subject populations”. Accordingly, Lijphart (1979) has quantified 
linguistic voting as a dichotomy between speakers of the majority and minority 
languages. I suggest that such approach assumes too simple relationship between 
nationality and vote and disregards more multifaceted association. Thus, ethnicity and 
language are here both measured as nominal variables according to the specific language 
respondent speaks at home (V247) and ethnic group she belongs to (V254). 
51 
 
Value cleavage. Components of this cleavage are quantified by estimating the level of 
post-materialism and libertarianism of respondent. Respondent’s post-materialism is 
expressed by a specific 12-item post-materialist index (Y001) measured on a five level 
scale that the 2010-2014 WVS data set contains. This has been calculated according to 
the answers to several questions that evaluate attitudes and values of respondent. The 
distinction between respondents who incline towards libertarianism and those towards 
authoritarianism is also made using a latent variable calculated according to self-
reflection of respondent. Libertarianism is expressed by being more open to new ideas 
and more creative (V70), being less restricted in social behavior (V77) and not prioritizing 
tradition and customs (V79). All three elements are measured on a six level scale and 
libertarianism variable is calculated as the sum of these values where 18 thus represents 
the highest level of libertarianism. 
Most of these variables are relatively valid, since they assess structural attributes that are 
easily observable and quantifiable. Exception here are the variables calculated from 
variables in the data set, namely occupation, post-materialism and libertarianism. While 
they are operationalized using theoretically quite precise measures, there are certainly 
other methods of doing this, so these variables might be somewhat ambiguous regarding 
validity. In this respect, also problematic is the ethnicity variable, since the measurement 
of this is not consistent throughout countries. In some countries ethnicity indicates race, 
while in others nationality. As such it may be seen as reflecting the most relevant approach 
to ethnicity in every country and is not necessarily a problem, but nevertheless has to be 
taken into account when interpreting the results. In terms of reliability, most variables are 
again quite consistently measureable, apart from those dependent on subjective 
assessment of respondent, such as social class, religiosity and clearly the components of 
value cleavage. Additionally, it has to be noted that in case of some categorical variables 
(religious denomination, region, ethnicity and language) combinations of category and 
party choice that are less frequent than 10 times in the data set are not involved in the 
analysis. Considering the sample sizes, such occurrences are too rare to indicate reliable 
patterns and are likely to be random. 
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 Results 
In order to make conclusions about the relevance of cleavages, three types of models 
outlined in previous section are tested on the WVS 2010-2014 data. This includes the 
base model, 13 cleavage component models and 5 cleavage models. This means that for 
each of the 50 countries left in the data set after aggregation, a total of 19 models are 
tested. The fact that analyses are carried out separately in every country rather than 
treating all the respondents as part of a single sample is essential. This takes into 
consideration the individuality of political systems and allows drawing conclusions 
accordingly, but also permits using countries as units of analysis in further evaluations. 
Such approach to assessing the relevance of cleavages is very similar to Dalton’s (1996) 
method. However, Dalton used Cramer’s V as a measure of association for social 
characteristics and party preference. This measures the correlation between two variable 
based on a contingency table, which does not allow a more intricate analysis dependent 
on model design. Here statistics that have been calculated using a more complex research 
design are presented to describe the relationship between the attributes of voters and their 
party choice. When reading the tables below, it is important to keep in mind that each 
model was tested separately in every country and the figures describing different models 
presented in the tables represent means of countries. 
4.1. Comparison of cleavage components 
To begin with, the comparison of the salience of cleavage components in party choice is 
analyzed. Regarding the economic cleavage components, the results of the analysis 
reported in table 1 seem to be in line with previous research that has focused on class and 
occupation as the main elements of economic cleavage in voting behavior. However, it is 
less clear which of the two is more significant. Considering the R2N estimate, occupation 
indicates a much higher association with party choice, while the value of R2adj statistic 
suggests that this is largely due to the number of independent variables included in the 
model and these do not actually improve it. Unexpected is the income model that turns 
from least relevant model into the best fitting one once the number of parameters is 
controlled for. This implies that the parameters included in the income model are most 
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relevant compared to other economic cleavage models, but overall the performance of 
income component model is still the lowest. It also remains undecided whether the 
employment sector or income has a stronger relationship with vote choice. The only 
conclusion that can be draw from the performance of economic cleavage components is 
then that social class and occupation tend to be more relevant attributes in cleavage voting 
than income and sector of employment. This leaves the assumption that a complex 
measure of voters occupation most accurately predicts party choice unclear, since it was 
not possible to determine, whether or not occupation is a better predictor of party choice. 
Table 1. Selected statistics describing the economic cleavage components statistics. 
                               Social class Income Occupation 
Employment  
sector 
R2N .17 .14 .21 .15 
R2M .063 .049 .077 .055 
R2adj .014 .016 -.0046 .011 
BIC                            1701 2505 2466 2300 
Chi2                           96 114 150 112 
Parameters                     32 33 78 46 
Observations                   611 927 834 829 
     
Religious cleavage is mostly defined by religious denomination as all the values of 
pseudo-R2 measures in table 2 imply. While in terms of the R2N and R
2
M statistics, 
religious denomination model performs notably better than the other two, this difference 
becomes less substantial when the number of parameters is also considered. Nevertheless, 
religious denomination is according to the results in table 4 still best predictor of party 
choice when compared to other components of the religious cleavage. Models including 
the practice of religion and subjective religiosity are fairly similar to one another in terms 
of the estimates reported in table 2. It is however apparent that subjective religiosity 
model is not the most preferred here. 
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Table 2. Selected statistics describing the religious cleavage components statistics. 
                               Practice 
Subjective  
religiosity 
Denomination 
R2N .15 .15 .21 
R2M .056 .054 .084 
R2adj .024 .021 .025 
BIC                            2568 2512 2041 
Chi2                           136 124 152 
Parameters                     33 33 57 
Observations                   957 924 739 
    
The estimates of the residential cleavage component models tests in table 4 reveal a 
substantial contrast between the performance of the urbanization and region models. Even 
after the number of parameters are controlled for, the values of all the pseudo-R2 statistics 
of region model still remain at least twice as high when compared to those describing the 
performance of the urbanization model. While the BIC statistic suggests an opposing 
inference, this is because this measure penalizes models more severely for the number of 
parameters than the R2adj estimate. There appear to be considerable differences between 
regions in terms of party choice. In any case, region is more relevant in determining party 
choice in comparison to the level of urbanization.  
Table 3. Selected statistics describing the residential cleavage components statistics. 
                               Urbanization Region 
R2N .15 .31 
R2M .054 .14 
R2adj .02 .042 
BIC                            2580 2731 
Chi2                           127 333 
Parameters                     34 100 
Observations                   926 962 
   
Unlike in case of previous cleavages, the components of national cleavage do not seem 
to differ almost at all. While the estimates in table 4 imply a slightly better performance 
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of the ethnicity model, differences that minor can be considered trivial. Interestingly, the 
R2adj of both models is relatively high when compared to all others, which suggests that 
all or most categories of language as well as ethnicity tend to have some effect on party 
choice. Although in the data set used for the analysis ethnicity was not consistently in 
every country regarded as an equivalent to nationality, the language and ethnicity 
variables may again measure the same phenomenon. The results of table 6 seem to support 
this assumption, since when both variables are included in the same model to explain 
party choice, the parameters do not all add significantly to the model. This nevertheless 
means that ethnicity is not a better predictor of vote choice, but both have a very similar 
effect on voting. 
Table 4. Selected statistics describing the national cleavage components statistics. 
                               Language Ethnicity 
R2N .2 .2 
R2M .084 .084 
R2adj .039 .038 
BIC                            2646 2632 
Chi2                           241 230 
Parameters                     61 58 
Observations                   986 961 
   
Despite that the estimates for the components of value cleavage in table 5 also do not 
seem to vary too much, the difference is nonetheless notable. Post-materialism model 
according to all the estimates in the table performs to some extent better than 
libertarianism model. This suggests that the division between post-materialists and 
materialists is more relevant than the traditionalist-libertarianist distinction, although the 
difference in the performance of the two models is not substantial. 
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Table 5. Selected statistics describing the value cleavage components statistics. 
                               
Post-
materialism 
Libertarianism 
R2N .15 .14 
R2M .054 .05 
R2adj .019 .016 
BIC                            2430 2509 
Chi2                           120 114 
Parameters                     33 33 
Observations                   900 915 
   
4.1. Relevance of cleavages 
The models of cleavage components behave fairly differently when tested on data, but 
how do the cleavage models compare? Different statistics that are used to describe the 
base and cleavage models which include all respective components are reported in table 
6. Examining the values of R2N, economic cleavage emerges as the most relevant in 
predicting party choice, with residential cleavage as a close runner-up. However, when 
R2adj value of the same models is considered, economic cleavage model becomes the least 
preferred. This implies that economic cleavage model includes a lot of redundant 
predictors that do not significantly improve it, although its weakness might also be the 
result of the fact that economic cleavage models on average include less observations in 
its testing as both McFadden’s pseudo-R2 measures seem to suggest. Other models seem 
to be more consistent in terms of the three pseudo-R2 values. Religious and national 
cleavage models are both to the same degree weaker that the two preferred models, with 
religious cleavage being on average somewhat more relevant than national cleavage. As 
might have been expected, the value cleavage is substantially weaker than other cleavages 
and indicates only a slight improvement to the base model. While it is not absolutely clear 
from table 6 whether economic or residential cleavage model should be preferred, the 
latter is nevertheless more relevant than religious cleavage. This suggests that economic 
and religious cleavages are not better than others at explaining party choice as assumed. 
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Table 6. Selected statistics describing the base model and five cleavage models. 
 Base Economic Religious Residential National Value 
R2N .11 .34 .25 .32 .22 .16 
R2M .039 .14 .1 .15 .088 .061 
R2adj .013 -.023 .031 .044 .028 .021 
BIC 2523 1777 1869 2835 2508 2481 
Chi2 93 178 181 351 221 138 
Parameters 27 106 62 110 78 39 
Observations 944 543 701 981 891 905 
       
4.2. Regional differences 
When conclusions have been made about the performance of cleavage models in general, 
it is appropriate to examine how these trends relate to different world’s regions. In order 
to evaluate differences between world’s regions, three distinctions between countries 
were made. South American, post-socialist and highly industrialized countries were 
distinguished from those that do not belong to these categories17. The differences in the 
performance of models in table 7 demonstrates some interesting peculiarities of South 
American countries. A notable contrast lies in the values of R2adj that tend to be negative 
in case of these countries. This is not only because on average the models of South 
American countries tend to include more parameters, but it very likely indicates that not 
all components of the cleavages or categories of these components matter in South 
America as much as they do elsewhere. For instance the economic cleavage seems to be 
significantly higher in South America according to the R2N statistic, but the value of R
2
adj 
implies the opposite, despite that on average the respective models contain less 
parameters. It is however noteworthy that while all the models perform worse in South 
                                                 
17 In the analysis, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay were considered as South 
American countries. The category of Post-socialist was comprised of countries such as Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia and Ukraine. The category 
of highly industrialized countries included Australia, Germany, Estonia, Japan, South Korea, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden and United States. 
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America, a remarkable exception is the economic cleavage model. Economic cleavage 
seems to be much more associated with party choice than in other continents. In contrast 
to some previous research (Bellucci and Heath 2012, 111), the results presented here 
suggest that higher economic inequalities might indeed have led to higher level voting on 
economic basis in South America. Another noteworthy dissimilarity is the national 
cleavage that does not seem to be a very good predictor of party choice in South America, 
despite the notable ethnic variations. Even though the magnitudes of the figures in table 
8 are relatively small, cleavage voting in South America seems to be somewhat lower 
than elsewhere according to most of the estimates. 
Table 7. Comparison of cleavage models statistics for South American and other 
countries. 
South America 
                               Base Economic Religious Residential National Value Mean 
R2N .093 .42 .23 .3 .16 .14 .24 
R2M .032 .18 .083 .13 .057 .048 .098 
R2adj .0036 -.048 -.045 -.013 -.012 .0017 -.022 
BIC                            1836 1248 1462 2239 2099 1750 1841 
Chi2                           58 143 93 216 105 77 131 
Parameters                     25 97 80 121 75 36 84 
Observations                   640 317 380 635 656 546 556 
Outside of South America 
                               Base Economic Religious Residential National Value Mean 
R2N .11 .33 .25 .33 .24 .17 .26 
R2M .04 .14  .11 .15 .098 .063 .1 
R2adj .015 -.018 .034 .061 .042 .024 .02 
BIC                            2638 1871 1890 3014 2645 2596 2367 
Chi2                           98 184 186 392 259 147 209 
Parameters                     27 108 61 106  79 40 76 
Observations                   995 583 717 1084 969 961 826 
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When the former socialist countries are compared to others, cleavage models display 
varying trends as illustrated in table 8. While the economic and value cleavages do not 
appear to differ at all, the other three cleavage models produce much higher pseudo-R2 
estimates. In case of the religious and residential models however the higher value of 
these statistics seem to be caused largely by the higher number of parameters that do not 
add to the models, whereas the national cleavage model maintains its better performance 
even the value of R2adj is taken into consideration.  
Table 8. Comparison of cleavage models statistics for post-socialist and other countries. 
Post-socialist 
                               Base Economic Religious Residential National Value Mean 
R2N .12 .34 .31 .37 .31 .16 .3 
R2M .039 .14 .097 .16 .12 .056 .12 
R2adj .014 -.039 .0052 .049 .079 .019 .0091 
BIC                            2821 2045 2933 3149 3671 2752 2644 
Chi2                           102 176 237 411 413 132 246 
Parameters                     29 122 120 130 85 44 100 
Observations                   989 572 656 1018 1280 942 839 
Not post-socialist 
                               Base Economic Religious Residential National Value Mean 
R2N .11 .34 .24 .3 .2 .16 .24 
R2M .039 .14 .1 .14 .082 .061 .1 
R2adj .013 -.017 .032 .041 .018 .022 .015 
BIC                            2456 1691 1816 2696 2276 2421 2209 
Chi2                           90 178 178 325 182 139 186 
Parameters                     26 101 59 101 76 39 71 
Observations                   934 534 703 964 813 896 774 
        
It is noteworthy that all the pseudo-R2 statistics for national cleavage model are markedly 
higher in former socialist countries than elsewhere. This should not be unexpected 
considering that these countries are nationally heterogeneous. In terms of the historical 
heritage of most of the post-socialist countries, it should not be thus surprising that 
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linguistic and national divides provide the main political conflict. Although religious and 
residential cleavages might also seem considerably more relevant in these countries 
according to the estimates in table 8, some of the components of these cleavages are 
redundant and do not actually increase the performance of the respective models. 
Nonetheless, cleavage voting in post-communist countries appears to be on average 
higher than elsewhere. 
Comparison of highly and less industrialized countries in table 9 again demonstrates that 
cleavage models perform differently in different contexts.  
Table 9. Comparison of cleavage models statistics for highly and less industrialized 
countries. 
Highly industrialized 
                               Base Economic Religious Residential National Value Mean 
R2N .12 .36 .17 .31 .25 .21 .27 
R2M .04 .14 .076 .1 .1 .079 .1 
R2adj .018 -.016 .007 .033 .074 .039 .019 
BIC                            2874 1914 1440 4202 2998 2598 2420 
Chi2                           110 192 97 367 294 185 203 
Parameters                     27 109 48 118 60 41 73 
Observations                   965 506 644 1112 1127 870 756 
Less industrialized 
                               Base Economic Religious Residential National Value Mean 
R2N .11 .33 .26 .33 .22 .15 .25 
R2M .039 .14 .11 .16 .085 .054 .1 
R2adj .011 -.025 .035 .046 .019 .015 .012 
BIC                            2409 1725 1941 2587 2410 2437 2247 
Chi2                           87 173 195 348 206 120 196 
Parameters                     26 105 65 108 82 39 78 
Observations                   937 557 710 957 844 918 796 
        
The economic, residential and national cleavages do not seem to affect party choice 
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differently in countries that are more industrialized compared to others, while religious 
and value cleavages indicate to some extent dissimilar trends. Religious cleavage model 
is much weaker according to the values of all of the pseudo-R2 statistics, whereas value 
cleavage model performs much better in the category of countries examined here. As 
previously described, these two cleavages are related and expected to behave in this way 
in more developed countries, where secularization has led to the decrease of religious 
sentiment among voters. Thus, the assumption that value cleavage is more relevant in 
highly industrialized countries finds support here. 
  
62 
 
Conclusions 
There are various theories that have attempted to distinguish and map the motives behind 
voting behavior. Yet, a number of approaches have in this regard often emphasized the 
influence of social structure that has the capacity to directly or via other phenomena to 
affect party choice. It is this relationship between different divides in society and party 
choice that this thesis intended to shed light on. In particular, the aim was here to compare 
the significance of five cleavages in different political systems and reveal which of these 
has the highest impact on party choice. In addition to cleavages, the social and value 
divisions that define these cleavages were also compared to one another and a comparison 
of some regional differences in cleavage voting was also included. 
The components of economic cleavage that encompasses subjective social class, 
occupation, income and employment sector, demonstrated statistically indecisive results 
regarding the performance of respective models. While it was not possible to determine 
which of these variables best explains party choice, social class and occupation models 
tended to be more preferred than income and employment sector models. This is 
somewhat expected, since class and occupation have been in the focus of much previous 
research on cleavage voting. In case of religious voting it was assumed that subjective 
religiosity rather than practice of religion or religious denomination best explains party 
choice. Empirical evidence however unambiguously suggested that it is the latter variable 
that best predicts party choice while subjective religiosity and practices have a similar 
effect. This might suggest that these two variables measure more or less the same 
phenomenon in the context of party choice. Analogous observation was made in case of 
language and ethnicity that define the nationality cleavage. Although there was reason to 
believe that ethnicity that entails more social and cultural differences than language and 
is thus more relevant for voting behavior, models for both of these variables had almost 
identical performance. The components of value cleavage were also observed to perform 
fairly similarly in the analysis, although post-materialism was found to be somewhat more 
relevant than libertarianism variable in party choice. This was expected, since the 
authoritarianism-libertarianism divide is much more limited. 
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Most decisive differences among components of cleavages were witnessed in case of 
residential cleavage. All the estimates taken as a point of departure in the analysis here 
implied that region in which voter resides is substantially more relevant predictor of vote 
choice than the level of urbanization. This suggests that party choice is very much 
dependent on geographical location, which should not be surprising, considering that 
even the level of urbanization varies from one region to another. 
The significance of residential cleavage furthermore became apparent in the comparison 
of the performance of cleavage models. Although it could be theoretically assumed that 
economic and religious cleavages are most salient, this assumption was not supported by 
empirical findings. Economic cleavage was statistically very relevant in explaining vote 
choice but not unquestionably so, and residential cleavage can be considered to be even 
more important in this respect. Contrary to expectations, religious and national cleavage 
were the second most relevant group of cleavages, with religion having a slightly higher 
influence on party choice. The relative irrelevance of the value cleavage in voting 
behavior should not be surprising, considering that it is usually considered as a fairly new 
phenomenon and not very strongly rooted in social structure. 
These contrasts between cleavages are however considerably altered when different parts 
of the world are differentiated. According to previous literature there was reason to 
believe three world’s regions to demonstrate different patterns of cleavage voting. While 
it had traditionally been assumed that cleavage voting is a rare phenomenon in South 
America, analysis here found an important exception to this tendency. Economic cleavage 
seems to be much more relevant in South America than elsewhere, which should not be 
surprising in the context of notable economic inequalities. Whereas cleavage voting is 
usually found to be weaker in new democracies, this was not found to be true for former 
socialist countries. While most cleavages seem to have a stronger influence on party 
choice in post-socialist countries, only national cleavage was unambiguously more 
important than elsewhere. This trend can be explained by the higher national 
heterogeneity of and respective conflicts in post-socialist countries. Finally, the balance 
of cleavages in highly industrialized countries was very similar to what different theories 
of modernization have suggested. In countries belonging to this group, value cleavage is 
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markedly more substantial in predicting party choice, while religious cleavage is not as 
important as elsewhere. These are only some patterns among countries in cleavage voting 
and exploring such trends definitely deserves further attention. 
It is noteworthy that residential cleavage tended to be constantly salient in different 
political systems. Considering that most literature on cleavage voting has so far almost 
exclusively focused on class and religious cleavages, the prominence of residential 
cleavage might be somewhat unexpected. This should however be anticipated when it is 
recognized that regions that define the residential cleavage are “containers” of other 
differences (Gidengil 1989, 564–5). As such, the region variable encompasses various 
contrasts among voters since regions themselves often differ greatly in terms of economy, 
religion and culture. Whether or not the significance of residential cleavage is an effect 
of other variables is however outside the scope of this analysis, but it certainly is a relevant 
question for further research on cleavage voting. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Coding of variables. Number of categories express the maximum number 
of unique categories within countries and the actual number differs from one country to 
another. All continuous variables except for gender are coded from lowest level or 
frequency to highest.  
Variable Level of measurement Coding 
Party choice Categorical 9 categories 
Gender Continuous 0-1 (1 for male) 
Age Continuous 16-99 
Education Continuous 1-9 
Social class Continuous 1-5 
Income Continuous 1-10 
Occupation Categorical 8 categories 
Employment sector Categorical 3 categories 
Practice of religion Continuous 1-7 
Subjective religiosity Continuous 1-3 
Religious denomination Categorical 53 categories 
Region Categorical 42 categories 
Urbanization Continuous 1-8 
Language Categorical 32 categories 
Ethnicity Categorical 40 categories 
Libertarianism Continuous 3-18 
Post-materialism  Continuous 0-5 
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Kokkuvõte  
„Sotsiaalsed erinevused valimiskäitumist määramas: lõhede mõju erakonnavalikule“ 
Valimiskäitumine on poliitikateadustes võrdlemisi laialdaselt uuritud nähtus ja erienvates 
käsitlustes on välja toodud üsna mitmeid tegureid, mis seda mõjutavad. Ühest küljest võib 
valijate otsuseid näha puhtalt ratsionaalsetena, teisalt sõtuvad need vähemalt minigl 
määral tema sotsiaalsest või kultuurilisest taustast. Mõlemal juhul võib aga sotsiaalset 
struktuuri käsitleda tegurina, mis kas otse või läbi teiste muutujate erakonnavalikut 
kujundab. Sellisest arusaamast lähtub ka käesolev magistritöö, üritades vastata 
küsimusele, millised ühiskondlikud lõhed kõige enam valijaid nende poliitiliste eelistuste 
puhul lõhestavad ja seega kõige paremini erakonnavalikut seletavad.  
Antud kontekstis on lõhedele omistatud mitmeid tingimusi, mis on eelduseks 
lõhedepõhisele hääletamisele. Näiteks on mõned autorid väitnud, et sotsiaalse erinevus 
peab olema vastavate ühiskondlike gruppide poolt tunnustatud, kanduma edasi 
põlvkondade vahel ning peegelduma jagatud väärtustes ja mingis vormis 
organisatsioonis, et muutuda erakonnavalikut mõjutavaks lõheks. Käesolevas töös lõhede 
defineerimisel niivõrd ranget ja piiritletud seisukohta ei võetud ja sellena käsitleti 
igasugust erienvust sotsiaalses struktuuris, mis on valimiste kontekstis oluline ja mille 
poliitiline olulisus on teoreetiliselt põhjendatav.  
Lõhedepõhise hääletamise üheks kõige laiemalt tunnustatud põhjenduseks võib pidada 
„külmunud“ parteisüsteemide teooriat. Selle järgi kujunesid paljudes riikides 
parteisüsteemid välja teatud ajaperioodil mõjutatuna tööstuslikust ja rahvuslikest 
revolutsioonidest, mistõttu peegeldavad ka kaasaegsed parteisüsteemid lõhesid kunagises 
ühiskondlikus struktuuris. Seetõttu pakuvad ühiskondlikud lõhed sõltumata nende 
mõnigasest  hääbumisest valijatele poliitilises mõttes aga endiselt olulisi vihjeid 
erakondliku valiku kohta. Nii on parteisüsteemid suhteliselt stabiilsed ja tugevdavad 
valijaskonna polariseerumist teatud lõhede alusel. 
Samas ei ole viimati mainitud põhjuslik seos aga tingimata ühepoolne. Ühest küljest 
pakuvad erakonnad ühiskondlikele lõhedele väljundit, ilma milleta ei oleks need 
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poliitiliselt olulised, samuti on erakondel võimalused poliitilist konflikti kujundada ja 
seeläbi määratelda olulisimad lõhed. Teisalt on erakonnad selles otseselt sõltuvad 
valijatest ja vähemalt mingil määral peab lõhedepõhine hääletamine kajastama alati 
sotsiaalseid erinevusi. Viimane lähenemine on seega selgemini mõistetav ja võetud 
käesolevas töös lähtepuktiks lõhedepõhise hääletamise käsitlusele. 
 Millised on siis need ühiskondlikud erinevused, mida võiks nimetada lõhedeks 
erakonnvaliku kontekstis? Varasemates uuringutes on kahtlemata enim tähelepanu 
pälvinud sotsiaalne klass ja religioon, mis iseloomustavad poliitiliste küsimuste puhul 
vastavalt majanduslikku ja moraalset dimensiooni. Lõhedena on käsitletud ka selliseid 
tunnuseid nagu sugu, vauns ja haridus, ent kuna ei ole selget teoreetilist põhjendust, miks 
need eripärad peaksid valijate otsuseid mõjutama, siis käesolevas töös neid lõhedena 
arvesse ei võeta. Samas on antud küsimuse puhul oluline vaadata kaugemale sotsiaalsest 
struktuurist. Nii ühiskondlikud kui ka psühholoogilised muutused valijate seas annavad 
alust arvata, et traditsioonilised lõhed ei ole kaasajal kuigi olulised ja tihti on viidatud 
asjaolule, et lõhedepõhine hääletamine on kadumas või ümber kujunemas. Seetõttu on 
oluline arvestada ka psühholoogiliste erinevustega valijate seas. Nii leidsid käesoelvas 
töös käsitlemist ühtekokku viis lõhe, millest igaüht mõtestati läbi konkreetsete erienvuste 
valijate vahel. Majanduslik lõhe seisnes tajutavas sotsiaalses klassis, töö iseloomus, 
sissetulekus ja majandussektoris. Religioosset lõhe määrasid usu praktiseerimine, 
subjektiivne usklikkus ja kuuluvus usulahku. Elukohapõhine lõhe väljendus 
linnastumises ja geograafilises piirkonnas. Rahvuslik lõhe põhines antud töös tunnustel 
nagu keel ja etnilisus. Lisaks neile ühiskondlikele lõhedele leidis käsitlemist ka 
väärtustepõhine lõhe, mis peegeldus valija postmaterialistlikes ja libertaarsustes 
hoiakutes. 
Mõistagi ei ole teatud sotsiaalsetel või psühholoogistel tunnustel igas poliitilises 
süsteemis valimiskäitumisele samaväärne mõju. Nii võib eeldada, et uuemates 
demokraatiates ei ole poliitiline konflikt jõudnud välja kujuneda ja ka valijad ei ole 
seetõttu jaotunud oma erakonnavalikus teatud tunnuste alusel. Seetõttu ei tohiks Lõuna-
Ameerikas ja post-sotsialistlikes riikides lõhedepõhine hääletamine olla niivõrd oluline 
kui teistes maades. Lisaks sellele võib moderniseerumisteooriate alusel arvata, et 
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majanduslikult enam arenenud riikides on erakonnavaliku puhul järjest olulisemaks 
muutumas hoiakud ja väärtused, mis võrreldes teiste maadega seega tööstusriikides ka 
lõhedepõhises hääletamises rohkem kajastuvad. 
Lõhedepõhise hääletamise uurimisel on äärmiselt oluline metodoloogia. Varasemad 
lõhesid puudutavad uuringud on jõudnud tihti üsna erinevate järeldusteni, mille põhjuseks 
võib olla nii erinev arusaam lõhedepõhisest valimisest kui ka erinev operatsionaliseering 
ja statistilised meetodid. Käesolevas töös ei võetud arvesste mitte ainult traditsioonilist, 
vaid igasugust lõhedepõhist hääletamist, samuti oli rõhuasetus eelkõige lõhede 
seletusvõimel. Usaldusväärsemate tulemuste saamiseks rakendati mitme muutujaga 
mudeleid ja muutujaid mõõdeti sealjuures võimalikult täpselt. Käesolevas töös testiti 
mitut multinoomse logistilise regressiooni mudelit Maailma väärtusuuringute andmete 
alusel, et hinnata nende sobivust ja teha selle alusel järeldusi nii lõhede kui ka neid 
defineerivate tunnuste olulisuse kohta erakonnavalikus.  
Kuigi majandusliku lõhe puhul ei olnud võimalik üheselt välja tuua kõige olulisemat 
tunnust, võib oletada, et poliitilisi eelistusi seletavad paremini hinnanguline sotsiaalne 
klass ja teatud möödnustega ka töö iseloom ning vähem sissetulek ja majandussektor.  
Religioosse ja elukohapõhise lõhe puhul olid selles osas aga selgelt suurema mõjuga 
vastavalt usulahk, millesse valija kuulus ja geograafiline piirkond, kus valija elas. 
Rahvusliku ja väärtustepõhise lõhe puhul tunnuste vahel olulisi erinevusi erakonnavaliku 
määramisel ei esinenud. Erinevalt mitmetest varasematest töödest ja teoreetilistest 
eeldustest ei olnud poliitiliste eelistuste seletamisel sugugi kõige olulisemad majanduslik 
ja religioosne lõhe. Kõige rohkem on erakondliku valikuga seotud lisaks majanduslikele 
tunnustele hoopis valija elukoht, kuigi majandusliku lõhe puhul ei olnud statistiline seos 
üheselt tugev. Veidi vähem on poliitiliste eelistustega seotud religioosne ja rahvuslik lõhe 
ning keskeltläbi kõige vähem olulised on selles kontekstis väärtused. On aga 
märkimisväärne, et elukoht on üks olulisimaid määrajaid erakonnavaliku puhul, mis võib 
olla seotud asjaoluga, et piirkondlikud erisused hõlmavad ka mitmeid teist laadi erienvusi. 
Ka riikide võrdluse puhul ei viidanud empiiriline analüüs kõigi eelduste paikapidavusele. 
Kuigi Lõuna-Ameerikas ei seleta lõhed tõepoolest erakonnavalikut nii selgelt kui mujal, 
võib seal täheldada majandusliku lõhe ülekaalukat domineerimist. Samas on post-
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sotsialistlikes riikides lõhedepõhine hääletamine aga mõnevõrra levinum kui teistes 
maades ja eriti tugevalt on antud piirkonnas poliitiliste eelistustega seotud rahvus. Kõrge 
majandusliku arenguga riikide puhul ei leidnud kinnitust mitte ainult eeldus, et 
väärtustepõhine hääletamine on kõrgem, vaid selgus ka asjaolu, et religioon on neis 
maades valimisotsuste puhul vähem oluline tegur. 
